Hi, On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 9:03 PM, Brian Gix <bgix@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hi Vinicius, > > I am sorry that it has taken so long to test the snapshot that you > placed on gitorious, but I have now done so. > > On Fri, 2010-12-03 at 19:05 -0300, Vinicius Costa Gomes wrote: >> Hi Brian, >> >> On 11:11 Fri 03 Dec, Brian Gix wrote: >> > >> > Hi Claudio, Johan & All, >> > >> > Is this LE capable kernel that Ville is working on, the development stream >> > for the LE Security Manager? And if so, is it in a partial fleshed out >> > state? >> >> There is a simple implementation of SMP here[1] on my "devel" branch. I am >> cleaning it up for sending it for review. >> >> If you want to help, have any comments or just want to tell us what you are >> working on, please drop by #bluez on freenode, or send an email. > > I have been able to verify that the Just Works negotiation of the Short > Term Key does work against an independent implementation of the LE > Security Manager, as long as I have requested no MITM protection. I > have the following comments: > > 1. You currently reject security if I *do* request MITM protection. > This should not be done. The correct functionality should be to > continue the negotiation. Even though I requested MITM, it will be > clear to both sides that JUST_WORKS methodology has been used, and so > when the Keys are generated and exchanged, both sides will indicate in > their Key Database that they are no-MITM keys. If I then actually > *needed* MITM protection, then whatever functionality requiring that > level of security will fail with an insufficient security error code. > However, security should *never* be rejected unless there is a > fundamental incompatibility such as no level of security actually > supported. This is the only functionality that I found to be actually > incorrect. But the point of MITM is man in the middle protection, so if we end up with a key which is not MITM there is no protection why store the link key? Actually if we do that we can end up in a situation where insufficient security is always triggered and the other stack may attempt to repair but with current code it will never succeed to generate a valid MITM link key. Anyway I suppose supporting MITM is mandatory so obviously the only possible fix for this is to support MITM. > 2. Currently, you are not exchanging any permanent keys, which I am sure > you are aware. This makes it impossible to test much else, such as > command signing, or security requests that use the generated keys. > > If you have a later version of SM that could be uploaded to your devel > branch on gitorious, I would be more than happy (and in fact would love > to be able) to test that for you as well. > > This is the git configuration I used for testing, which only has your SM > up to the end of last December, and is so about a month old: > > remote.origin.url=git://gitorious.org/bluetooth-next/bluetooth-next.git > branch.devel.remote=origin > branch.devel.merge=refs/heads/devel > > > Thanks for doing the SM, > > -- > Brian Gix > bgix@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Employee of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. > Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-bluetooth" in > the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > -- Luiz Augusto von Dentz Computer Engineer -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-bluetooth" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
