Hi Brian, On 10:26 Tue 07 Dec, Brian Gix wrote: > > > Hi Vinicius, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: linux-bluetooth-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:linux-bluetooth- > > owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Vinicius Costa Gomes > > Sent: 06 December, 2010 1:44 PM > > To: linux-bluetooth@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Cc: Anderson Briglia; Vinicius Costa Gomes > > Subject: [RFC v2 4/9] Bluetooth: simple SMP pairing negotiation > > > > From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > This implementation only exchanges SMP messages between the Host and > > the > > Remote. No keys are being generated. TK and STK generation will be > > provided in further patches. > > > > Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 3 +- > > net/bluetooth/smp.c | 114 > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > > 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c > > index 674799c..da4f13d 100644 > > --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c > > +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c > > @@ -4630,7 +4630,8 @@ static void l2cap_recv_frame(struct l2cap_conn > > *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) > > break; > > > > case L2CAP_CID_SMP: > > - smp_sig_channel(conn, skb); > > + if (smp_sig_channel(conn, skb)) > > + l2cap_conn_del(conn->hcon, 0x05); > > break; > > > > default: > > diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c > > index e9dde5f..b25010f 100644 > > --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c > > +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c > > @@ -64,6 +64,102 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, > > u8 code, u16 len, void *data) > > hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0); > > } > > > > +static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct > > sk_buff *skb) > > +{ > > + struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data; > > + > > + BT_DBG(""); > > + > > + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct smp_cmd_pairing)); > > + > > + rp->io_capability = 0x00; > > + rp->oob_flag = 0x00; > > + rp->max_key_size = 16; > > + rp->init_key_dist = 0x00; > > + rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00; > > + rp->auth_req &= 0x05; > > + > > + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp); > > +} > > As a "placeholder" I understand that there is a fair amount of fleshing > out that these changes need. However, as you have an conn->hcon->out > flag that indicates direction (which hopefully is based on Link Master), > I would like to see checking in this function and next, that the > correct role has received these SMP packets, with a rejection if they > were received by the incorrect role. Also, although the placeholder is > requesting no key distribution, in the fleshed out version, the responder > should be returning the subset (logical AND) of the requesters and the > responders key_dist masks, which in this case is still of course Zero. > Yeah, that kind of protocol checking is something that is really lacking. This RFC is just the implementation of the Just Works pairing procedure, without any support for key distribution. And as you noted, many things were implemented using this assumption. > I'm sorry if this is to many comments for this starting point. Keep them coming :-) they are being very helpful. > > > + > > +static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct > > sk_buff *skb) > > +{ > > + struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; > > + > > + BT_DBG(""); > > + > > + memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm)); > > + > > + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); > > +} > > + > > +static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct > > sk_buff *skb) > > +{ > > + BT_DBG(""); > > + > > + if (conn->hcon->out) { > > + struct smp_cmd_pairing_random random; > > + > > + BT_DBG("master"); > > + > > + memset(&random, 0, sizeof(struct smp_cmd_pairing_random)); > > + > > + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random), > > + &random); > > + } else { > > + struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm confirm; > > + > > + BT_DBG("slave"); > > + > > + memset(&confirm, 0, sizeof(struct > > smp_cmd_pairing_confirm)); > > + > > + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, > > sizeof(confirm), > > + &confirm); > > + } > > +} > > + > > +static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct > > sk_buff *skb) > > +{ > > + struct smp_cmd_pairing_random cp; > > + > > + BT_DBG(""); > > + > > + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct smp_cmd_pairing_random)); > > + > > + /* FIXME: check if random matches */ > > The random numbers will not match. The correct check will be that > when the encryption with p1, p2, k, and the remote's random number, > is performed, that it matches the confirm previously received > via smp_cmd_pairing_confirm. The comment is wrong. Will fix. > > > + > > + if (conn->hcon->out) { > > + BT_DBG("master"); > > + /* FIXME: start encryption */ > > + } else { > > + BT_DBG("slave"); > > + > > + memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(struct smp_cmd_pairing_random)); > > + > > + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(cp), > > &cp); > > + } > > +} > > + > > +static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct > > sk_buff *skb) > > +{ > > + struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data; > > + struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; > > + > > + BT_DBG(""); > > + > > + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct smp_cmd_security_req)); > > + memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(struct smp_cmd_pairing)); > > + > > + cp.io_capability = 0x00; > > + cp.oob_flag = 0x00; > > + cp.max_key_size = 16; > > + cp.init_key_dist = 0x00; > > + cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00; > > + cp.auth_req = rp->auth_req & 0x05; > > + > > + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); > > +} > > + > > This function may need to be overloaded, such that if an existing > set of keys already exist (from an earlier pairing) that they are > used by simply encrypting the link, or signing the WRITE_CMD pkt > as needed. Should the link encryption fail due to remote rejection, > we might then request security, subject to the same limitations > used by BR/EDR's SSP. This particular function is just for the actual SMP Security Request Command. But yeah, we need to have a single starting point for both when we have the keys or not. How signing will be implemented is still an open point on my mind. > > But I do not know where the division lies between the key storage dB, > the kernel mode code and the user mode code. > > > > int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level) > > { > > __u8 authreq; > > @@ -114,23 +210,33 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, > > struct sk_buff *skb) > > > > switch (code) { > > case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ: > > - reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; > > - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, 1, &reason); > > - err = -1; > > + smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb); > > break; > > > > case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL: > > break; > > > > case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP: > > + smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb); > > + break; > > + > > + case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: > > + smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb); > > + break; > > + > > case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: > > + smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb); > > + break; > > + > > case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: > > + smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb); > > + break; > > + > > case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: > > case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: > > case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: > > case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: > > case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: > > - case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: > > default: > > BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); > > > > -- > > 1.7.3.2 > > > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux- > > bluetooth" in > > the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > Cheers, -- Vinicius -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-bluetooth" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
