Hi Johan, > When initiating dedicated bonding a L2CAP raw socket with HIGH security > level is used. The kernel is supposed to trigger the authentication > request in this case but this doesn't happen currently for non-SSP > (pre-2.1) devices. The reason is that the authentication request happens > in the remote extended features callback which never gets called for > non-SSP devices. This patch fixes the issue by requesting also > authentiation in the (normal) remote features callback in the case of > non-SSP devices. > > This rule is applied only for HIGH security level which might at first > seem unintuitive since on the server socket side MEDIUM is already > enough for authentication. However, for the clients we really want to > prefer the server side to decide the authentication requrement in most > cases, and since most client sockets use MEDIUM it's better to be > avoided on the kernel side for these sockets. The important socket to > request it for is the dedicated bonding one and that socket uses HIGH > security level. > > The patch is based on the initial investigation and patch proposal from > Andrei Emeltchenko <endrei.emeltchenko@xxxxxxxxx>. > > Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@xxxxxxxxx> so I had a quick review here on this one. Looks fine to me and it makes sense. Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Regards Marcel -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-bluetooth" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html