On Wed, Jul 13, 2022 at 05:38:42PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 7/13/2022 5:05 PM, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring:
> > add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct
> > file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use
> > to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command
> > passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details.
> >
> > This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something
> > conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file
> > operation.
>
> tl;dr - Yuck. Again.
>
> You're passing the complexity of uring-cmd directly into each
> and every security module. SELinux, AppArmor, Smack, BPF and
> every other LSM now needs to know the gory details of everything
> that might be in any arbitrary subsystem so that it can make a
> wild guess about what to do. And I thought ioctl was hard to deal
> with.
Yes... I cannot agree anymore.
> Look at what Paul Moore did for the existing io_uring code.
> Carry that forward into your passthrough implementation.
Which one in particular? I didn't see any glaring obvious answers.
> No, I don't think that waving security away because we haven't
> proposed a fix for your flawed design is acceptable. Sure, we
> can help.
Hey if the answer was obvious it would have been implemented.
Luis
