On 08.07.21 16:22, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
On Thu, Jul 08, 2021 at 02:43:42PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0 user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest). Unfortunately blkfront in the Linux kernel is fully trusting its backend. This series is fixing blkfront in this regard. It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret.Wow. This looks like what Marek did .. in 2018! https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-04/msg02336.html
Yes, seems to have been a similar goal.
Would it be worth crediting Marek?
I'm fine mentioning his patches, but I didn't know of his patches until having sent out V1 of my series. I'd be interested in learning why his patches haven't been taken back then. Juergen
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