From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Be more detailed about the CPU cache management situation. The same goes for both sanitize and secure erase. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-2-dave@xxxxxxxxxxxx Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@xxxxxxxxx> --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl index 6350dd82b9a9..c4c4acb1f3b3 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl @@ -82,7 +82,11 @@ Description: whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity, or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires - the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges. + the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any + HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache + management, relying instead for it to be done when a region + transitions between software programmed and hardware committed + states. What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase @@ -92,7 +96,12 @@ Contact: linux-cxl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Description: (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for - all user data areas of the device. + all user data areas of the device. This functionality requires + the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any + HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache + management, relying instead for it to be done when a region + transitions between software programmed and hardware committed + states. What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/ -- 2.34.1
