Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > We have numerous ways to intercept file reads and make them either > block or fail. The obvious one to me is security_file_permission() > called from rw_verify_area(). Can we do everything we need with an LSM? I like the idea. That runs when someone opens a file right? What about if they already had the file open or mapped before the volume was locked? If not, is that OK? Are we just trying to deny open requests of files while the volume is locked? Is that in addition to, or instead of throwing out the key and suspending IO at the block layer? If it is in addition, then that would mean that trying to open a file would fail cleanly, but accessing a page that is already mapped could hang the task. In an unkillable state. For a long time. Even the OOM killer can't kill a task blocked like that can it? Or did that get fixed at some point?
