On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 10:33:13PM -0400, Paul Davis wrote: > i'm relatively skeptical of any claims for audio steganography that > can survive arbitrary psycho-acoustic compression. It can still be done, using 'high level' features of the audio signal. For example, a lot of music contains regular rythmic patterns. Small timing errors can be used to insert a watermark. Even if the result sounds different when compared to the original, that doesn't mean you could tell which is which - the watermarked file can be 'as good' as the original. And in fact in many cases it's not even necessary to do this: the content watermarks itself. The probability that another rendering of the same music would reproduce the same error pattern is as good as zero. So if you find this pattern the file must be a copy. A variation on this is used to check the authenticity of some recordings in forensic audio. Almost all 'surveillance' audio contains some low level 50/60 Hz. If the recording is done on a digital device then its clock can be assumed to be more stable than the mains frequency, so any variations in this can be measured and compared against a database (which some forensic labs have been building up over the last years - it's possible because power grids are coupled over very large areas, e.g. almost all of western Europe). The result indicates when the recording was made. 10-15 minutes is enough for a very reliable timestamp in most cases. > in addition, random > permutations of the least significant bits of a PCM encoding will > almost certainly eliminate or at least reduce the confidence level > associated with the presence or absence of the watermark), in a way > that will be inaudible to more or less anyone. Watermarks are not inserted directly as 'digital' information, (as could be done for steganography) precisely for this reason. Ciao, -- FA _______________________________________________ Linux-audio-user mailing list Linux-audio-user@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.linuxaudio.org/listinfo/linux-audio-user
