On 4/27/2020 8:59 PM, Bhaumik Bhatt wrote:
From: Hemant Kumar <hemantk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
When MHI Driver receives an EOT event, it reads xfer_len from the
event in the last TRE. The value is under control of the MHI device
and never validated by Host MHI driver. The value should never be
larger than the real size of the buffer but a malicious device can
set the value 0xFFFF as maximum. This causes device to memory
The device will overflow, or the driver?
overflow (both read or write). Fix this issue by reading minimum of
transfer length from event and the buffer length provided.
Signed-off-by: Hemant Kumar <hemantk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Bhaumik Bhatt <bbhatt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/bus/mhi/core/main.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/bus/mhi/core/main.c b/drivers/bus/mhi/core/main.c
index 1ccd4cc..3d468d9 100644
--- a/drivers/bus/mhi/core/main.c
+++ b/drivers/bus/mhi/core/main.c
@@ -521,7 +521,10 @@ static int parse_xfer_event(struct mhi_controller *mhi_cntrl,
mhi_cntrl->unmap_single(mhi_cntrl, buf_info);
result.buf_addr = buf_info->cb_buf;
- result.bytes_xferd = xfer_len;
+
+ /* truncate to buf len if xfer_len is larger */
+ result.bytes_xferd =
+ min_t(u16, xfer_len, buf_info->len);
mhi_del_ring_element(mhi_cntrl, buf_ring);
mhi_del_ring_element(mhi_cntrl, tre_ring);
local_rp = tre_ring->rp;
--
Jeffrey Hugo
Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. is a member of the
Code Aurora Forum, a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project.
