On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 12:55:30PM -0700, Scott Branden wrote: > Hi Takashi > > On 2019-08-23 5:29 a.m., Takashi Iwai wrote: > > On Thu, 22 Aug 2019 21:24:45 +0200, > > Scott Branden wrote: > > > Add kernel_pread_file* support to kernel to allow for partial read > > > of files with an offset into the file. Existing kernel_read_file > > > functions call new kernel_pread_file functions with offset=0 and > > > flags=KERNEL_PREAD_FLAG_WHOLE. > > Would this change passes the security check like ima? > > I thought security_kernel_post_read_file() checks the whole content > > for calculating the hash... > > It passes the fw_run_tests.sh. How do you test the firmware loader passes > this security check? Its not a security check per code, its an audit of the code, to ensure that no new cases are not covered and its why I had CC'd Mimi. The question lies in *if* the approach exposes a new interface which cannot be attested. Its unclear to me if we can attest currently through security modules the fallback interface, as there are not APIs with a respective callback yet. Luis
