Re: [PATCH v1 1/3] dt-bindings: soc: qcom: eud: Update compatible strings for eud

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On 8/14/2024 3:30 AM, Konrad Dybcio wrote:
On 14.08.2024 8:15 AM, Krzysztof Kozlowski wrote:
On 13/08/2024 22:03, Melody Olvera wrote:

On 8/8/2024 4:00 AM, Krzysztof Kozlowski wrote:
On 07/08/2024 20:32, Melody Olvera wrote:
The EUD can more accurately be divided into two types; a secure type
which requires that certain registers be updated via scm call and a
nonsecure type which must access registers nonsecurely. Thus, change
the compatible strings to reflect secure and nonsecure eud usage.

Signed-off-by: Melody Olvera <quic_molvera@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
   Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml | 6 +++---
   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml
index f2c5ec7e6437..476f92768610 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ properties:
     compatible:
       items:
         - enum:
-          - qcom,sc7280-eud
-      - const: qcom,eud
+          - qcom,secure-eud
+          - qcom,eud
Commit msg did not explain me why DT bindings rules are avoided here and
you drop existing SoC specific compatible.

This really does not look like having any sense at all, I cannot come up
with logic behind dropping existing users. You could deprecate it, but
then why exactly this device should have exception from generic bindings
rule?
Understood. I won't drop this compatible string. Is alright to add the
additional compatible as is?
You always need SoC specific compatible.
Melody, is there any way to discover (that won't crash the board if we
guess wrong) whether secure accessors are needed?


Unfortunately, no. We considered several options, but none guarantee that we will avoid a crash if we try non-securely. The secure call also won't give a specific error if it fails either (for security reasons) so we can't know if a secure access failed because it's supposed to be
accessed non-securely or for another reason; hence this approach. If there's
another way to achieve this functionality that might be better, I'm all ears.

Thanks,
Melody




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