On Wed, Feb 21, 2024 at 12:18 PM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 21, 2024 at 11:22 AM Edgecombe, Rick P > <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Wed, 2024-02-21 at 14:06 -0500, dalias@xxxxxxxx wrote: > > > Due to arbitrarily nestable signal frames, no, this does not suffice. > > > An interrupted operation using the lock could be arbitrarily delayed, > > > even never execute again, making any call to dlopen deadlock. > > > > Doh! Yep, it is not robust to this. The only thing that could be done > > would be a timeout in dlopen(). Which would make the whole thing just > > better than nothing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It's fine to turn RDSSP into an actual emulated read of the SSP, or > > > at > > > least an emulated load of zero so that uninitialized data is not left > > > in the target register. > > > > We can't intercept RDSSP, but it becomes a NOP by default. (disclaimer > > x86-only knowledge). > > > > > If doing the latter, code working with the > > > shadow stack just needs to be prepared for the possibility that it > > > could be async-disabled, and check the return value. > > > > > > I have not looked at all the instructions that become #UD but I > > > suspect they all have reasonable trivial ways to implement a > > > "disabled" version of them that userspace can act upon reasonably. > > > > This would have to be thought through functionally and performance > > wise. I'm not opposed if can come up with a fully fleshed out plan. How > > serious are you in pursuing musl support, if we had something like > > this? > > > > HJ, any thoughts on whether glibc would use this as well? > > Assuming that we are talking about permissive mode, if kernel can > suppress UD, we don't need to disable SHSTK. Glibc can enable > ARCH_SHSTK_SUPPRESS_UD instead. Kernel must suppress all possible SHSTK UDs. > > It is probably worth mentioning that from the security side (as Mark > > mentioned there is always tension in the tradeoffs on these features), > > permissive mode is seen by some as something that weakens security too > > much. Apps could call dlopen() on a known unsupported DSO before doing > > ROP. I don't know if you have any musl users with specific shadow stack > > use cases to ask about this. > > > > -- > H.J. -- H.J.
