On 04/17, Martin KaFai Lau wrote:
> On 4/14/23 6:55 PM, Stanislav Fomichev wrote:
> > On 04/13, Stanislav Fomichev wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 7:38 AM Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn
> > > <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 4:22 PM Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 3:35 PM Alexander Mikhalitsyn
> > > > > <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > During work on SO_PEERPIDFD, it was discovered (thanks to Christian),
> > > > > > that bpf cgroup hook can cause FD leaks when used with sockopts which
> > > > > > install FDs into the process fdtable.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > After some offlist discussion it was proposed to add a blacklist of
> > > > >
> > > > > We try to replace this word by either denylist or blocklist, even in changelogs.
> > > >
> > > > Hi Eric,
> > > >
> > > > Oh, I'm sorry about that. :( Sure.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > socket options those can cause troubles when BPF cgroup hook is enabled.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Can we find the appropriate Fixes: tag to help stable teams ?
> > > >
> > > > Sure, I will add next time.
> > > >
> > > > Fixes: 0d01da6afc54 ("bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooks")
> > > >
> > > > I think it's better to add Stanislav Fomichev to CC.
> > >
> > > Can we use 'struct proto' bpf_bypass_getsockopt instead? We already
> > > use it for tcp zerocopy, I'm assuming it should work in this case as
> > > well?
> >
> > Jakub reminded me of the other things I wanted to ask here bug forgot:
> >
> > - setsockopt is probably not needed, right? setsockopt hook triggers
> > before the kernel and shouldn't leak anything
> > - for getsockopt, instead of bypassing bpf completely, should we instead
> > ignore the error from the bpf program? that would still preserve
> > the observability aspect
>
> stealing this thread to discuss the optlen issue which may make sense to
> bypass also.
>
> There has been issue with optlen. Other than this older post related to
> optlen > PAGE_SIZE:
> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/5c8b7d59-1f28-2284-f7b9-49d946f2e982@xxxxxxxxx/,
> the recent one related to optlen that we have seen is
> NETLINK_LIST_MEMBERSHIPS. The userspace passed in optlen == 0 and the kernel
> put the expected optlen (> 0) and 'return 0;' to userspace. The userspace
> intention is to learn the expected optlen. This makes 'ctx.optlen >
> max_optlen' and __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_getsockopt() ends up returning
> -EFAULT to the userspace even the bpf prog has not changed anything.
(ignoring -EFAULT issue) this seems like it needs to be
if (optval && (ctx.optlen > max_optlen || ctx.optlen < 0)) {
/* error */
}
?
> Does it make sense to also bypass the bpf prog when 'ctx.optlen >
> max_optlen' for now (and this can use a separate patch which as usual
> requires a bpf selftests)?
Yeah, makes sense. Replacing this -EFAULT with WARN_ON_ONCE or something
seems like the way to go. It caused too much trouble already :-(
Should I prepare a patch or do you want to take a stab at it?
> In the future, does it make sense to have a specific cgroup-bpf-prog (a
> specific attach type?) that only uses bpf_dynptr kfunc to access the optval
> such that it can enforce read-only for some optname and potentially also
> track if bpf-prog has written a new optval? The bpf-prog can only return 1
> (OK) and only allows using bpf_set_retval() instead. Likely there is still
> holes but could be a seed of thought to continue polishing the idea.
Ack, let's think about it.
Maybe we should re-evaluate 'getsockopt-happens-after-the-kernel' idea
as well? If we can have a sleepable hook that can copy_from_user/copy_to_user,
and we have a mostly working bpf_getsockopt (after your refactoring),
I don't see why we need to continue the current scheme of triggering
after the kernel?
> > - or maybe we can even have a per-proto bpf_getsockopt_cleanup call that
> > gets called whenever bpf returns an error to make sure protocols have
> > a chance to handle that condition (and free the fd)
> >
>
>
