To avoid false positives, KMSAN needs to unpoison the data copied from the userspace. To detect infoleaks - check the memory buffer passed to copy_to_user(). Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx> --- v2: -- move implementation of kmsan_copy_to_user() here Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I43e93b9c02709e6be8d222342f1b044ac8bdbaaf --- include/linux/instrumented.h | 5 ++++- include/linux/kmsan-checks.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++++ mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/instrumented.h b/include/linux/instrumented.h index ee8f7d17d34f5..c73c1b19e9227 100644 --- a/include/linux/instrumented.h +++ b/include/linux/instrumented.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * This header provides generic wrappers for memory access instrumentation that - * the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN. + * the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN, KMSAN. */ #ifndef _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H #define _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/kasan-checks.h> #include <linux/kcsan-checks.h> +#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h> #include <linux/types.h> /** @@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ instrument_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { kasan_check_read(from, n); kcsan_check_read(from, n); + kmsan_copy_to_user(to, from, n, 0); } /** @@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ static __always_inline void instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n, unsigned long left) { + kmsan_unpoison_memory(to, n - left); } #endif /* _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h b/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h index ecd8336190fc0..aabaf1ba7c251 100644 --- a/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h +++ b/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h @@ -84,6 +84,21 @@ void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size); */ void kmsan_check_memory(const void *address, size_t size); +/** + * kmsan_copy_to_user() - Notify KMSAN about a data transfer to userspace. + * @to: destination address in the userspace. + * @from: source address in the kernel. + * @to_copy: number of bytes to copy. + * @left: number of bytes not copied. + * + * If this is a real userspace data transfer, KMSAN checks the bytes that were + * actually copied to ensure there was no information leak. If @to belongs to + * the kernel space (which is possible for compat syscalls), KMSAN just copies + * the metadata. + */ +void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy, + size_t left); + #else #define kmsan_init(value) (value) @@ -98,6 +113,10 @@ static inline void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) static inline void kmsan_check_memory(const void *address, size_t size) { } +static inline void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, + size_t to_copy, size_t left) +{ +} #endif diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c index a13e15ef2bfd5..365eedcb08953 100644 --- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c +++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c @@ -212,6 +212,44 @@ void kmsan_iounmap_page_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_iounmap_page_range); +void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy, + size_t left) +{ + unsigned long ua_flags; + + if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime()) + return; + /* + * At this point we've copied the memory already. It's hard to check it + * before copying, as the size of actually copied buffer is unknown. + */ + + /* copy_to_user() may copy zero bytes. No need to check. */ + if (!to_copy) + return; + /* Or maybe copy_to_user() failed to copy anything. */ + if (to_copy <= left) + return; + + ua_flags = user_access_save(); + if ((u64)to < TASK_SIZE) { + /* This is a user memory access, check it. */ + kmsan_internal_check_memory((void *)from, to_copy - left, to, + REASON_COPY_TO_USER); + user_access_restore(ua_flags); + return; + } + /* Otherwise this is a kernel memory access. This happens when a compat + * syscall passes an argument allocated on the kernel stack to a real + * syscall. + * Don't check anything, just copy the shadow of the copied bytes. + */ + kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata((void *)to, (void *)from, + to_copy - left); + user_access_restore(ua_flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_copy_to_user); + /* Functions from kmsan-checks.h follow. */ void kmsan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { -- 2.35.1.1021.g381101b075-goog
