On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 09:42:44PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead > to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker > to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing > malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of > the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee. > > A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process > and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating > processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a > target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target > process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer). > > Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> -- Kees Cook
