Explain no_user_shstk/no_user_ibt kernel parameters, and introduce a new
document on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +
Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 136 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 143 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index a10b545c2070..96f65530768c 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3202,6 +3202,12 @@
noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
+ no_user_shstk [X86-64] Disable Shadow Stack for user-mode
+ applications
+
+ no_user_ibt [X86-64] Disable Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode
+ applications
+
nosmap [X86,PPC]
Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
even if it is supported by processor.
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
index 4693e192b447..cf5250a3cc70 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation
tlb
mtrr
pat
+ intel_cet
intel-iommu
intel_txt
amd-memory-encryption
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..93aa289e4439
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=========================================
+Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
+=========================================
+
+[1] Overview
+============
+
+Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) is an Intel processor feature
+that provides protection against return/jump-oriented programming (ROP)
+attacks. It can be set up to protect both applications and the kernel.
+Only user-mode protection is implemented in the 64-bit kernel, including
+support for running legacy 32-bit applications.
+
+CET introduces Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking. Shadow stack is
+a secondary stack allocated from memory and cannot be directly modified by
+applications. When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the
+return address to both the normal stack and the shadow stack. Upon
+function return, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it
+to the normal stack copy. If the two differ, the processor raises a
+control-protection fault. Indirect branch tracking verifies indirect
+CALL/JMP targets are intended as marked by the compiler with 'ENDBR'
+opcodes.
+
+There is a Kconfig option:
+
+ X86_CET.
+
+To build a CET-enabled kernel, Binutils v2.31 and GCC v8.1 or LLVM v10.0.1
+or later are required. To build a CET-enabled application, GLIBC v2.28 or
+later is also required.
+
+There are two command-line options for disabling CET features::
+
+ no_user_shstk - disables user shadow stack, and
+ no_user_ibt - disables user indirect branch tracking.
+
+At run time, /proc/cpuinfo shows CET features if the processor supports
+CET.
+
+[2] Application Enabling
+========================
+
+An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can be
+verified from readelf/llvm-readelf output:
+
+ readelf -n <application> | grep -a SHSTK
+ properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTK
+
+If an application supports CET and is statically linked, it will run with
+CET protection. If the application needs any shared libraries, the loader
+checks all dependencies and enables CET when all requirements are met.
+
+[3] Backward Compatibility
+==========================
+
+GLIBC provides a few CET tunables via the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment
+variable:
+
+GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.hwcaps=-SHSTK,-IBT
+ Turn off SHSTK/IBT.
+
+GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.x86_shstk=<on, permissive>
+ This controls how dlopen() handles SHSTK legacy libraries::
+
+ on - continue with SHSTK enabled;
+ permissive - continue with SHSTK off.
+
+Details can be found in the GLIBC manual pages.
+
+[4] CET arch_prctl()'s
+======================
+
+Several arch_prctl()'s have been added for CET:
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, u64 *addr)
+ Return CET feature status.
+
+ The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer.
+ On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following
+ information::
+
+ *addr = shadow stack/indirect branch tracking status
+ *(addr + 1) = shadow stack base address
+ *(addr + 2) = shadow stack size
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned int features)
+ Disable shadow stack and/or indirect branch tracking as specified in
+ 'features'. Return -EPERM if CET is locked.
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
+ Lock in all CET features. They cannot be turned off afterwards.
+
+Note:
+ There is no CET-enabling arch_prctl function. By design, CET is enabled
+ automatically if the binary and the system can support it.
+
+[5] The implementation of the Shadow Stack
+==========================================
+
+Shadow Stack size
+-----------------
+
+A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory to a fixed size of
+MIN(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB). In other words, the shadow stack is allocated to
+the maximum size of the normal stack, but capped to 4 GB. However,
+a compat-mode application's address space is smaller, each of its thread's
+shadow stack size is MIN(1/4 RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB).
+
+Signal
+------
+
+The main program and its signal handlers use the same shadow stack.
+Because the shadow stack stores only return addresses, a large shadow
+stack covers the condition that both the program stack and the signal
+alternate stack run out.
+
+The kernel creates a restore token for the shadow stack restoring address
+and verifies that token when restoring from the signal handler.
+
+Fork
+----
+
+The shadow stack's vma has VM_SHSTK flag set; its PTEs are required to be
+read-only and dirty. When a shadow stack PTE is not RO and dirty, a
+shadow access triggers a page fault with the shadow stack access bit set
+in the page fault error code.
+
+When a task forks a child, its shadow stack PTEs are copied and both the
+parent's and the child's shadow stack PTEs are cleared of the dirty bit.
+Upon the next shadow stack access, the resulting shadow stack page fault
+is handled by page copy/re-use.
+
+When a pthread child is created, the kernel allocates a new shadow stack
+for the new thread.
--
2.21.0
