3.2.101-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx> commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 upstream. Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: linux-arch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: alan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct sysde { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct sysdev_class *dev,
