On 01/20/2018, 07:36 PM, Williams, Dan J wrote: > Dan Williams (9): > asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references > x86: implement array_ptr_mask() > x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence > x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec > x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation > x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation > vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation > nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params > > Mark Rutland (1): > Documentation: document array_ptr > > Documentation/speculation.txt | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 + > arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 28 ++++++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 3 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h | 24 +++++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 15 +++- > arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 6 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 ++-- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 19 ++--- > arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 5 ++ > arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 8 +-- > include/linux/fdtable.h | 7 +- > include/linux/nospec.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++ > net/wireless/nl80211.c | 10 ++- Could you update also cpu_show_spectre_v1? thanks, -- js suse labs
