[PATCH v4.1 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation

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Quoting Linus:

    I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
    the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
    agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
    because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
    but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
    that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
    space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
    accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.

Unlike the '__get_user' case 'get_user' includes the address limit check
near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be
mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier. Where the
narrowing is performed by:

	cmp %limit, %ptr
	sbb %mask, %mask
	and %mask, %ptr

With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit
or NULL.

Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/lib/getuser.S      |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
index db333300bd4b..2b4ad4c6a226 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
@@ -25,6 +25,23 @@
 
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 
+/*
+ * MASK_NOSPEC - sanitize the value of a user controlled value with
+ * respect to speculation
+ *
+ * In the get_user path once we have determined that the pointer is
+ * below the current address limit sanitize its value with respect to
+ * speculation. In the case when the pointer is above the address limit
+ * this directs the cpu to speculate with a NULL ptr rather than
+ * something targeting kernel memory.
+ *
+ * assumes CF is set from a previous 'cmp TASK_addr_limit, %ptr'
+ */
+.macro MASK_NOSPEC mask val
+	sbb \mask, \mask
+	and \mask, \val
+.endm
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SMAP
 
 #define ASM_CLAC \
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
index c97d935a29e8..07d0e8a28b17 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1)
 	mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
 	cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
 	jae bad_get_user
+	MASK_NOSPEC %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
 	ASM_STAC
 1:	movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
 	xor %eax,%eax
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2)
 	mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
 	cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
 	jae bad_get_user
+	MASK_NOSPEC %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
 	ASM_STAC
 2:	movzwl -1(%_ASM_AX),%edx
 	xor %eax,%eax
@@ -68,6 +70,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4)
 	mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
 	cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
 	jae bad_get_user
+	MASK_NOSPEC %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
 	ASM_STAC
 3:	movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%edx
 	xor %eax,%eax
@@ -83,6 +86,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8)
 	mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
 	cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
 	jae bad_get_user
+	MASK_NOSPEC %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
 	ASM_STAC
 4:	movq -7(%_ASM_AX),%rdx
 	xor %eax,%eax
@@ -94,6 +98,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8)
 	mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
 	cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
 	jae bad_get_user_8
+	MASK_NOSPEC %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
 	ASM_STAC
 4:	movl -7(%_ASM_AX),%edx
 5:	movl -3(%_ASM_AX),%ecx




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