On 01/11/2018 04:58 PM, Dan Williams wrote: > On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 1:54 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Tue, 9 Jan 2018, Josh Poimboeuf wrote: >>> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: >>>> On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote: >>>>> >>>>> [ ... snip ... ] >>>>>> Andi Kleen (1): >>>>>> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok >>>>>> >>>>>> Dan Williams (13): >>>>>> x86: implement nospec_barrier() >>>>>> [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> p54: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> Thermal/int340x: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> net: mpls: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> userns: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution >>>>>> >>>>>> Mark Rutland (4): >>>>>> asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers >>>>>> Documentation: document nospec helpers >>>>>> arm64: implement nospec_ptr() >>>>>> arm: implement nospec_ptr() >>>>> >>>>> So considering the recent publication of [1], how come we all of a sudden >>>>> don't need the barriers in ___bpf_prog_run(), namely for LD_IMM_DW and >>>>> LDX_MEM_##SIZEOP, and something comparable for eBPF JIT? >>>>> >>>>> Is this going to be handled in eBPF in some other way? >>>>> >>>>> Without that in place, and considering Jann Horn's paper, it would seem >>>>> like PTI doesn't really lock it down fully, right? >>>> >>>> Here is the latest (v3) bpf fix: >>>> >>>> https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856645/ >>>> >>>> I currently have v2 on my 'nospec' branch and will move that to v3 for >>>> the next update, unless it goes upstream before then. >> >> Daniel, I guess you're planning to send this still for 4.15? > > It's pending in the bpf.git tree: > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git/commit/?id=b2157399cc9 Sorry for the delay, just noticed the question now since not on Cc either: It made it into in DaveM's tree already and part of his latest pull-req to Linus. >>> That patch seems specific to CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL. Is the bpf() syscall >>> the only attack vector? Or are there other ways to run bpf programs >>> that we should be worried about? >> >> Seems like Alexei is probably the only person in the whole universe who >> isn't CCed here ... let's fix that. > > He will be cc'd on v2 of this series which will be available later today.
