On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 5:25 PM, Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 12:56 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> This protection is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT
>> implementation from PaX/grsecurity. This speeds up the refcount_t API by
>> duplicating the existing atomic_t implementation with a single instruction
>> added to detect if the refcount has wrapped past INT_MAX (or below 0)
>> resulting in a signed value.
> [...]
>> +static __always_inline void refcount_dec(refcount_t *r)
>> +{
>> + asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "decl %0\n\t"
>> + REFCOUNT_CHECK_UNDERFLOW(4)
>> + : [counter] "+m" (r->refs.counter)
>> + : : "cc", "cx");
>> +}
>
> What purpose do checks on decrement now have? The mitigation is only
> intended to deal with (positive) overflows, right? AFAICS if you hit this code,
> similar to the inc-from-0 case, you're already in a UAF situation?
Yeah, I think that's true, but as Peter has mentioned: it's better
than not having it. The inc path can be deterministic, and the dec
path can be lucky? :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
