Hi James, Is this series something you would carry in the security-next tree? That has traditionally been where seccomp features have landed in the past. -Kees On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 10:55 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 9:49 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 07/10, Kees Cook wrote: >>> >>> This adds the ability for threads to request seccomp filter >>> synchronization across their thread group (at filter attach time). >>> For example, for Chrome to make sure graphic driver threads are fully >>> confined after seccomp filters have been attached. >>> >>> To support this, locking on seccomp changes via thread-group-shared >>> sighand lock is introduced, along with refactoring of no_new_privs. Races >>> with thread creation are handled via delayed duplication of the seccomp >>> task struct field and cred_guard_mutex. >>> >>> This includes a new syscall (instead of adding a new prctl option), >>> as suggested by Andy Lutomirski and Michael Kerrisk. >> >> I do not not see any problems in this version, > > Awesome! Thank you for all the reviews. :) If Andy and Michael are > happy with this too, I think this is in good shape. \o/ > > -Kees > >> >> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> >> > > > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS Security -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-arch" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
