On 02/24, Will Drewry wrote:
>
> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
> {
> struct seccomp_filter *f;
> - u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
> static const struct bpf_load_fn fns = {
> bpf_load,
> sizeof(struct seccomp_data),
> };
> + u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
> const void *sc_ptr = (const void *)(uintptr_t)syscall;
>
> + /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
> + if (unlikely(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
> + ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
Is "seccomp.filter == NULL" really possible?
Oleg.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-arch" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
