On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 09:26:22AM +0100, Steve Dower wrote: > On 17/07/2024 07:33, Jeff Xu wrote: > > Consider those cases: I think: > > a> relying purely on userspace for enforcement does't seem to be > > effective, e.g. it is trivial to call open(), then mmap() it into > > executable memory. > > If there's a way to do this without running executable code that had to pass > a previous execveat() check, then yeah, it's not effective (e.g. a Python > interpreter that *doesn't* enforce execveat() is a trivial way to do it). > > Once arbitrary code is running, all bets are off. So long as all arbitrary > code is being checked itself, it's allowed to do things that would bypass > later checks (and it's up to whoever audited it in the first place to > prevent this by not giving it the special mark that allows it to pass the > check). Exactly. As explained in the patches, one crucial prerequisite is that the executable code is trusted, and the system must provide integrity guarantees. We cannot do anything without that. This patches series is a building block to fix a blind spot on Linux systems to be able to fully control executability.
