Re: [RFC 1/3] pidfd: allow pidfd_open() on non-thread-group leaders

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On 12/7/23 3:58 PM, Christian Brauner wrote:
> [adjusting Cc as that's really a separate topic]
> 
> On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 08:43:18PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> * Mathieu Desnoyers:
>>
>>>>> I'd like to offer a userspace API which allows safe stashing of
>>>>> unreachable file descriptors on a service thread.
> 
> Fwiw, systemd has a concept called the fdstore:
> 
> https://systemd.io/FILE_DESCRIPTOR_STORE
> 
> "The file descriptor store [...] allows services to upload during
> runtime additional fds to the service manager that it shall keep on its
> behalf. File descriptors are passed back to the service on subsequent
> activations, the same way as any socket activation fds are passed.
> 
> [...]
> 
> The primary use-case of this logic is to permit services to restart
> seamlessly (for example to update them to a newer version), without
> losing execution context, dropping pinned resources, terminating
> established connections or even just momentarily losing connectivity. In
> fact, as the file descriptors can be uploaded freely at any time during
> the service runtime, this can even be used to implement services that
> robustly handle abnormal termination and can recover from that without
> losing pinned resources."
> 
>>
>>>> By "safe" here do you mean not accessible via pidfd_getfd()?
>>
>> No, unreachable by close/close_range/dup2/dup3.  I expect we can do an
>> intra-process transfer using /proc, but I'm hoping for something nicer.
> 
> File descriptors are reachable for all processes/threads that share a
> file descriptor table. Changing that means breaking core userspace
> assumptions about how file descriptors work. That's not going to happen
> as far as I'm concerned.
> 
> We may consider additional security_* hooks in close*() and dup*(). That
> would allow you to utilize Landlock or BPF LSM to prevent file
> descriptors from being closed or duplicated. pidfd_getfd() is already
> blockable via security_file_receive().
> 
> In general, messing with fds in that way is really not a good idea.
> 
> If you need something that awkward, then you should go all the way and
> look at io_uring which basically has a separate fd-like handle called
> "fixed files".
> 
> Fixed file indexes are separate file-descriptor like handles that can
> only be used from io_uring calls but not with the regular system call
> interface.
> 
> IOW, you can refer to a file using an io_uring fixed index. The index to
> use can be chosen by userspace and can't be used with any regular
> fd-based system calls.
> 
> The io_uring fd itself can be made a fixed file itself
> 
> The only thing missing would be to turn an io_uring fixed file back into
> a regular file descriptor. That could probably be done by using
> receive_fd() and then installing that fd back into the caller's file
> descriptor table. But that would require an io_uring patch.

FWIW, since it was very trivial, I posted an rfc/test patch for just
that with a test case. It's here:

https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/df0e24ff-f3a0-4818-8282-2a4e03b7b5a6@xxxxxxxxx/

-- 
Jens Axboe





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