Re: [PATCH 2/3] fs: Allow user to lock mount attributes with mount_setattr

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On Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 02:00:43AM -0700, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> We support locking certain mount attributes in the kernel. This API
> isn't directly exposed to users. Right now, users can lock mount
> attributes by going through the process of creating a new user
> namespaces, and when the mounts are copied to the "lower privilege"
> domain, they're locked. The mount can be reopened, and passed around
> as a "locked mount".

Not sure if that's what you're getting at but you can actually fully
create these locked mounts already:

P1                                                 P2
# init userns + init mountns                       # init userns + init mountns
sudo mount --bind /foo /bar
sudo mount --bind -o ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec /bar

# unprivileged userns + unprivileged mountns
unshare --mount --user --map-root

mount --bind -oremount

fd = open_tree(/bar, OPEN_TREE_CLONE)

send(fd_send, P2);

                                                   recv(&fd_recv, P1)
                                                   move_mount(fd_recv, /locked-mnt);

and now you have a fully locked mount on the host for P2. Did you mean that?

> Locked mounts are useful, for example, in container execution without
> user namespaces, where you may want to expose some host data as read
> only without allowing the container to remount the mount as mutable.
> The API currently requires that the given privilege is taken away
> while or before locking the flag in the less privileged position.
> This could be relaxed in the future, where the user is allowed to
> remount the mount as read only, but once they do, they cannot make
> it read only again.

s/read only/read write/

> Right now, this allows for all flags that are lockable via the
> userns unshare trick to be locked, other than the atime related
> ones. This is because the semantics of what the "less privileged"
> position is around the atime flags is unclear.

I think that atime stuff doesn't really make sense to expose to
userspace. That seems a bit pointless imho.

> Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  fs/namespace.c             | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  include/uapi/linux/mount.h |  2 ++
>  2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 54847db5b819..5396e544ac84 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static LIST_HEAD(ex_mountpoints); /* protected by namespace_sem */
>  struct mount_kattr {
>  	unsigned int attr_set;
>  	unsigned int attr_clr;
> +	unsigned int attr_lock;

So when I originally noted down this crazy idea
I didn't envision a new struct member but rather a flag that could be
raised in attr_set like MOUNT_ATTR_LOCK that would indicate for the
other flags in attr_set to become locked.

So if we could avoid growing the struct pointlessly I'd prefer that. Is
there a reason that wouldn't work?

I have no strong feelings about this tbh. It seems useful overall to
have this ability. But it deviates a bit from regular mount semantics in
that you can lock mount properties for the lifetime of the mount

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