On 2023-08-10, Sargun Dhillon <sargun@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> We support locking certain mount attributes in the kernel. This API
> isn't directly exposed to users. Right now, users can lock mount
> attributes by going through the process of creating a new user
> namespaces, and when the mounts are copied to the "lower privilege"
> domain, they're locked. The mount can be reopened, and passed around
> as a "locked mount".
>
> Locked mounts are useful, for example, in container execution without
> user namespaces, where you may want to expose some host data as read
> only without allowing the container to remount the mount as mutable.
>
> The API currently requires that the given privilege is taken away
> while or before locking the flag in the less privileged position.
> This could be relaxed in the future, where the user is allowed to
> remount the mount as read only, but once they do, they cannot make
> it read only again.
>
> Right now, this allows for all flags that are lockable via the
> userns unshare trick to be locked, other than the atime related
> ones. This is because the semantics of what the "less privileged"
> position is around the atime flags is unclear.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/namespace.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 2 ++
> 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 54847db5b819..5396e544ac84 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static LIST_HEAD(ex_mountpoints); /* protected by namespace_sem */
> struct mount_kattr {
> unsigned int attr_set;
> unsigned int attr_clr;
> + unsigned int attr_lock;
> unsigned int propagation;
> unsigned int lookup_flags;
> bool recurse;
> @@ -3608,6 +3609,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mount, char __user *, dev_name, char __user *, dir_name,
>
> #define MOUNT_SETATTR_PROPAGATION_FLAGS \
> (MS_UNBINDABLE | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_SHARED)
> +#define MOUNT_SETATTR_VALID_LOCK_FLAGS \
> + (MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY | MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID | MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV | \
> + MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC)
>
> static unsigned int attr_flags_to_mnt_flags(u64 attr_flags)
> {
> @@ -3629,6 +3633,22 @@ static unsigned int attr_flags_to_mnt_flags(u64 attr_flags)
> return mnt_flags;
> }
>
> +static unsigned int attr_flags_to_mnt_lock_flags(u64 attr_flags)
> +{
> + unsigned int mnt_flags = 0;
> +
> + if (attr_flags & MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY)
> + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
> + if (attr_flags & MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID)
> + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_NOSUID;
> + if (attr_flags & MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV)
> + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_NODEV;
> + if (attr_flags & MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC)
> + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC;
> +
> + return mnt_flags;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Create a kernel mount representation for a new, prepared superblock
> * (specified by fs_fd) and attach to an open_tree-like file descriptor.
> @@ -4037,11 +4057,18 @@ static int mount_setattr_prepare(struct mount_kattr *kattr, struct mount *mnt)
> int err;
>
> for (m = mnt; m; m = next_mnt(m, mnt)) {
> - if (!can_change_locked_flags(m, recalc_flags(kattr, m))) {
> + int new_mount_flags = recalc_flags(kattr, m);
> +
> + if (!can_change_locked_flags(m, new_mount_flags)) {
> err = -EPERM;
> break;
> }
It just occurred to me that the whole MNT_LOCK_* machinery has the
unfortunate consequence of restricting the host root user from being
able to modify the locked flags. Since this change will let you do this
without creating a userns, do we want to make can_change_locked_flags()
do capable(CAP_SYS_MOUNT)?
> + if ((new_mount_flags & kattr->attr_lock) != kattr->attr_lock) {
> + err = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + }
Since the MNT_LOCK_* flags are invisible to userspace, it seems more
reasonable to have the attr_lock set be added to the existing set rather
than requiring userspace to pass the same set of flags.
Actually, AFAICS this implementation breaks backwards compatibility
because with this change you now need to pass MNT_LOCK_* flags if
operating on a mount that has locks applied already. So existing
programs (which have .attr_lock=0) will start getting -EINVAL when
operating on mounts with locked flags (such as those locked in the
userns case). Or am I missing something?
In any case, the most reasonable behaviour would be to OR the requested
lock flags with the existing ones IMHO.
> +
> err = can_idmap_mount(kattr, m);
> if (err)
> break;
> @@ -4278,8 +4305,14 @@ static int build_mount_kattr(const struct mount_attr *attr, size_t usize,
> if ((attr->attr_set | attr->attr_clr) & ~MOUNT_SETATTR_VALID_FLAGS)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + if (attr->attr_lock & ~MOUNT_SETATTR_VALID_LOCK_FLAGS)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> kattr->attr_set = attr_flags_to_mnt_flags(attr->attr_set);
> kattr->attr_clr = attr_flags_to_mnt_flags(attr->attr_clr);
> + kattr->attr_lock = attr_flags_to_mnt_flags(attr->attr_lock);
> + kattr->attr_set |= attr_flags_to_mnt_lock_flags(attr->attr_lock);
> +
>
> /*
> * Since the MOUNT_ATTR_<atime> values are an enum, not a bitmap,
> @@ -4337,7 +4370,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mount_setattr, int, dfd, const char __user *, path,
> struct mount_attr attr;
> struct mount_kattr kattr;
>
> - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct mount_attr) != MOUNT_ATTR_SIZE_VER0);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct mount_attr) != MOUNT_ATTR_SIZE_VER1);
>
> if (flags & ~(AT_EMPTY_PATH |
> AT_RECURSIVE |
> @@ -4360,7 +4393,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mount_setattr, int, dfd, const char __user *, path,
> /* Don't bother walking through the mounts if this is a nop. */
> if (attr.attr_set == 0 &&
> attr.attr_clr == 0 &&
> - attr.propagation == 0)
> + attr.propagation == 0 &&
> + attr.attr_lock == 0)
> return 0;
>
> err = build_mount_kattr(&attr, usize, &kattr, flags);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
> index 4d93967f8aea..de667c4f852d 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
> @@ -131,9 +131,11 @@ struct mount_attr {
> __u64 attr_clr;
> __u64 propagation;
> __u64 userns_fd;
> + __u64 attr_lock;
> };
>
> /* List of all mount_attr versions. */
> #define MOUNT_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 32 /* sizeof first published struct */
> +#define MOUNT_ATTR_SIZE_VER1 40
>
> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_MOUNT_H */
> --
> 2.39.3
>
--
Aleksa Sarai
Senior Software Engineer (Containers)
SUSE Linux GmbH
<https://www.cyphar.com/>
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