On Mon, Jun 12, 2023 at 05:10:42PM -0700, Rick Edgecombe wrote: > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h > @@ -342,7 +342,36 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); > #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ > > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK > -# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 /* Should not be set with VM_SHARED */ > +/* > + * This flag should not be set with VM_SHARED because of lack of support > + * core mm. It will also get a guard page. This helps userspace protect > + * itself from attacks. The reasoning is as follows: > + * > + * The shadow stack pointer(SSP) is moved by CALL, RET, and INCSSPQ. The > + * INCSSP instruction can increment the shadow stack pointer. It is the > + * shadow stack analog of an instruction like: > + * > + * addq $0x80, %rsp > + * > + * However, there is one important difference between an ADD on %rsp > + * and INCSSP. In addition to modifying SSP, INCSSP also reads from the > + * memory of the first and last elements that were "popped". It can be > + * thought of as acting like this: > + * > + * READ_ONCE(ssp); // read+discard top element on stack > + * ssp += nr_to_pop * 8; // move the shadow stack > + * READ_ONCE(ssp-8); // read+discard last popped stack element > + * > + * The maximum distance INCSSP can move the SSP is 2040 bytes, before > + * it would read the memory. Therefore a single page gap will be enough > + * to prevent any operation from shifting the SSP to an adjacent stack, > + * since it would have to land in the gap at least once, causing a > + * fault. > + * > + * Prevent using INCSSP to move the SSP between shadow stacks by > + * having a PAGE_SIZE guard gap. > + */ > +# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 > #else > # define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_NONE > #endif This is a lot of very x86-specific language in a generic header file. I'm sure there's a better place for all this text.