Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] random: a simple vDSO mechanism for reseeding userspace CSPRNGs

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On 1/12/23 11:55, Yann Droneaud wrote:
Hi

12 janvier 2023 à 18:07 "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> a écrit:
Sorry Yann, but I'm not interested in this approach, and I don't think
reviewing the details of it are a good allocation of time. I don't
want to lock the kernel into having specific reseeding semantics that
are a contract with userspace, which is what this approach does.

This patch adds a mean for the kernel to tell userspace: between the
last time you call us with getrandom(timestamp,, GRND_TIMESTAMP),
something happened that trigger an update to the opaque cookie given
to getrandom(timestamp, GRND_TIMESTAMP). When such update happen,
userspace is advised to discard buffered random data and retry.

The meaning of the timestamp cookie is up to the kernel, and can be
changed anytime. Userspace is not expected to read the content of this
blob. Userspace only acts on the length returned by getrandom(,, GRND_TIMESTAMP):
  -1 : not supported
   0 : cookie not updated, no need to discard buffered data
  >0 : cookie updated, userspace should discard buffered data

For the cookie, I've used a single u64, but two u64 could be a better start,
providing room for implementing improved behavior in future kernel versions.

Please just let me iterate on my original patchset for a little bit,
without adding more junk to the already overly large conversation.

I like the simplicity of my so called "junk". It's streamlined, doesn't
require a new syscall, doesn't require a new copy of ChaCha20 code.

I'm sorry it doesn't fit your expectations.


Why would anything more than a 64-bit counter be ever necessary? It only needs to be incremented.

Let user space manage keeping track of the cookie matching its own buffers. You do NOT want this to be stateful, because that's just begging for multiple libraries to step on each other.

Export the cookie from the vdso and volià, a very cheap check around any user space randomness buffer will work:

	static clone_cookie_t last_cookie;
	clone_cookie_t this_cookie;

	this_cookie = get_clone_cookie();
	do {
		while (this_cookie != last_cookie) {
			last_cookie = this_cookie;
			reinit_randomness();
			this_cookie = get_clone_cookie();
		}

		extract_randomness_from_buffer();
		this_cookie = get_clone_cookie();
	} while (this_cookie != last_cookie);

	last_cookie = this_cookie;

	-hpa



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