Re: [PATCH v38 06/39] LSM: lsm_self_attr syscall for LSM self attributes

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



At least linux-api@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx should be in Cc for new syscalls.

You need a dedicated patch to wire this syscall with all architectures. It will help a lot dealing with merge conflicts because of other new syscalls. You can take a look at the Landlock syscall implementations: https://git.kernel.org/c/torvalds/a49f4f81cb48925e8d7cbd9e59068f516e984144

About the name, I'd suggest using a verb, something like lsm_get_self_attr.


On 27/09/2022 21:53, Casey Schaufler wrote:
Create a system call lsm_self_attr() to provide the security
module maintained attributes of the current process. Historically
these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in
procfs under /proc/self/attr.

I think this paragraph is not enough to justify a new syscall. We should highlight what is not possible (or difficult) to do with the filesystem: e.g. - usable in a sandbox which may not have access to the filesystem (but is that a good thing here?);
- clearly defined ABI/format;
- …?

What is the goal of this syscall? How will it be used? By who?



Attributes are provided as a collection of lsm_ctx structures
which are placed into a user supplied buffer. Each structure
identifys the security module providing the attribute, which

"identifies"


of the possible attributes is provided, the size of the
attribute, and finally the attribute value. The format of the
attribute value is defined by the security module, but will
always be \0 terminated. The ctx_len value will be larger than
strlen(ctx).

	------------------------------
	| unsigned int id            |
	------------------------------
	| unsigned int flags         |
	------------------------------
	| __kernel_size_t ctx_len    |
	------------------------------
	| unsigned char ctx[ctx_len] |
	------------------------------
	| unsigned int id            |
	------------------------------
	| unsigned int flags         |
	------------------------------
	| __kernel_size_t ctx_len    |
	------------------------------
	| unsigned char ctx[ctx_len] |
	------------------------------

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
  arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |   1 +
  include/linux/syscalls.h               |   1 +
  include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h      |   5 +-
  include/uapi/linux/lsm.h               |  21 ++++
  kernel/sys_ni.c                        |   3 +
  security/Makefile                      |   1 +
  security/lsm_syscalls.c                | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
  7 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
  create mode 100644 security/lsm_syscalls.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index c84d12608cd2..56d5c5202fd0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@
  448	common	process_mrelease	sys_process_mrelease
  449	common	futex_waitv		sys_futex_waitv
  450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node	sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	lsm_self_attr		sys_lsm_self_attr
#
  # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index a34b0f9a9972..7f87ef8be546 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned int flags);
  asmlinkage long sys_set_mempolicy_home_node(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
  					    unsigned long home_node,
  					    unsigned long flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_lsm_self_attr(struct lsm_ctx *ctx, size_t *size, int flags);
/*
   * Architecture-specific system calls
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index 45fa180cc56a..aa66718e1b48 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -886,8 +886,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)
  #define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450
  __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node)
+#define __NR_lsm_self_attr 451
+__SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_self_attr, sys_lsm_self_attr)
+
  #undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 451
+#define __NR_syscalls 452

This need to move to a dedicated "wire syscall" patch.


/*
   * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
index 4bb692b84a28..5acd791f82a9 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
@@ -9,6 +9,27 @@
  #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_LSM_H
  #define _UAPI_LINUX_LSM_H
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+
+/**
+ * struct lsm_ctx - LSM context
+ * @id: the LSM id number, see LSM_ID_XXX
+ * @flags: context specifier and LSM specific flags
+ * @ctx_len: the size of @ctx
+ * @ctx: the LSM context, a nul terminated string
+ *
+ * @ctx in a nul terminated string.

"NULL-terminated"?


+ *	(strlen(@ctx) < @ctx_len) is always true.
+ *	(strlen(@ctx) == @ctx_len + 1) is not guaranteed.
+ */
+struct lsm_ctx {
+	unsigned int		id;

I suggest using __u32 instead of unsigned int.

+	unsigned int		flags;

What could be the use case for these flags?


+	__kernel_size_t		ctx_len;
+	unsigned char		ctx[];
+};

To avoid holes in this struct, you might want to use __attribute__((packed)).


+
  /*
   * ID values to identify security modules.
   * A system may use more than one security module.
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
index 860b2dcf3ac4..0fdb0341251d 100644
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -262,6 +262,9 @@ COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(recvmsg);
  /* mm/nommu.c, also with MMU */
  COND_SYSCALL(mremap);
+/* security/lsm_syscalls.c */
+COND_SYSCALL(lsm_self_attr);
+
  /* security/keys/keyctl.c */
  COND_SYSCALL(add_key);
  COND_SYSCALL(request_key);
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 18121f8f85cd..59f238490665 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
# always enable default capabilities
  obj-y					+= commoncap.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) 			+= lsm_syscalls.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)			+= min_addr.o
# Object file lists
diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..da0fab7065e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * System calls implementing the Linux Security Module API.
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022 Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *  Copyright (C) Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+struct feature_map {
+	char *name;
+	int feature;
+};
+
+static const struct feature_map lsm_attr_names[] = {
+	{ .name = "current",	.feature = LSM_ATTR_CURRENT, },
+	{ .name = "exec",	.feature = LSM_ATTR_EXEC, },
+	{ .name = "fscreate",	.feature = LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE, },
+	{ .name = "keycreate",	.feature = LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE, },
+	{ .name = "prev",	.feature = LSM_ATTR_PREV, },
+	{ .name = "sockcreate",	.feature = LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, },
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsm_self_attr - Return current task's security module attributes
+ * @ctx: the LSM contexts
+ * @size: size of @ctx, updated on return
+ * @flags: reserved for future use, must be zero
+ *
+ * Returns the calling task's LSM contexts. On success this
+ * function returns the number of @ctx array elements. This value
+ * may be zero if there are no LSM contexts assigned.


If @size is
+ * insufficient to contain the return data -E2BIG is returned and
+ * @size is set to the minimum required size.

I'd prefer @size to not be a pointer but a value, and then only be read to get the context size.

Because lazy userspace only reading the top
If the ctx buffer is not big enough,


In all other cases
+ * a negative value indicating the error is returned.



lsm_module_list() already returns the enabled LSM IDs. It would be much simpler to only returns the properties of a specified LSM.
The syscall could then look like this:
lsm_get_self_attr(__u32 lsm_id, char *attr, size_t size, __u32 flags)



+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lsm_self_attr,
+	       struct lsm_ctx __user *, ctx,
+	       size_t __user *, size,
+	       int, flags)
+{
+	struct lsm_ctx *final = NULL;
+	struct lsm_ctx *interum;
+	struct lsm_ctx *ip;
+	void *curr;
+	char **interum_ctx;
+	char *cp;
+	size_t total_size = 0;
+	int count = 0;
+	int attr;
+	int len;
+	int rc = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	interum = kzalloc(ARRAY_SIZE(lsm_attr_names) * lsm_id *
+			  sizeof(*interum), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (interum == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	ip = interum;
+
+	interum_ctx = kzalloc(ARRAY_SIZE(lsm_attr_names) * lsm_id *
+			      sizeof(*interum_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (interum_ctx == NULL) {
+		kfree(interum);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	for (attr = 0; attr < ARRAY_SIZE(lsm_attr_names); attr++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < lsm_id; i++) {
+			if ((lsm_idlist[i]->features &
+			     lsm_attr_names[attr].feature) == 0)
+				continue;
+
+			len = security_getprocattr(current, lsm_idlist[i]->id,
+						   lsm_attr_names[attr].name,
+						   &cp);
+			if (len <= 0)
+				continue;
+
+			ip->id = lsm_idlist[i]->id;
+			ip->flags = lsm_attr_names[attr].feature;
+			/* space for terminating \0 is allocated below */
+			ip->ctx_len = len + 1;
+			interum_ctx[count] = cp;
+			/*
+			 * Security modules have been inconsistent about
+			 * including the \0 terminator in the size. The
+			 * context len has been adjusted to ensure there
+			 * is one.
+			 * At least one security module adds a \n at the
+			 * end of a context to make it look nicer. Change
+			 * that to a \0 so that user space doesn't have to
+			 * work around it. Because of this meddling it is
+			 * safe to assume that lsm_ctx.name is terminated
+			 * and that strlen(lsm_ctx.name) < lsm.ctx_len.
+			 */
+			total_size += sizeof(*interum) + ip->ctx_len;
+			cp = strnchr(cp, len, '\n');
+			if (cp != NULL)
+				*cp = '\0';
+			ip++;
+			count++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (count == 0)
+		goto free_out;
+
+	final = kzalloc(total_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (final == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_out;
+	}
+
+	curr = final;
+	ip = interum;
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		memcpy(curr, ip, sizeof(*interum));
+		curr += sizeof(*interum);
+		memcpy(curr, interum_ctx[i], ip->ctx_len);
+		curr += ip->ctx_len;
+		ip++;
+	}
+
+	if (get_user(len, size)) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto free_out;
+	}
+	if (total_size > len) {
+		rc = -ERANGE;
+		goto free_out;
+	}
+	if (copy_to_user(ctx, final, total_size) != 0 ||
+	    put_user(total_size, size) != 0)
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+	else
+		rc = count;
+
+free_out:
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		kfree(interum_ctx[i]);
+	kfree(interum_ctx);
+	kfree(interum);
+	kfree(final);
+	return rc;
+}



[Index of Archives]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]

  Powered by Linux