On Thu, 2021-10-07 at 20:29 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > On 07/10/2021 00:03, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 07:15:42PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > >> There was no new reviews, probably because the FS maintainers were busy, > >> and I was focused on Landlock (which is now in -next), but I plan to > >> send a new patch series for trusted_for(2) soon. > > > > Hi! > > > > Did this ever happen? It looks like it's in good shape, and I think it's > > a nice building block for userspace to have. Are you able to rebase and > > re-send this? > > I just sent it: > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211007182321.872075-1-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx/ > > Some Signed-off-by would be appreciated. :) > >From the cover letter, It is important to note that this can only enable to extend access control managed by the kernel. Hence it enables current access control mechanism to be extended and become a superset of what they can currently control. Indeed, the security policy could also be delegated to an LSM, either a MAC system or an integrity system. For instance, this is required to close a major IMA measurement/appraisal interpreter integrity gap by bringing the ability to check the use of scripts [1]. Other uses are expected, such as for magic-links [2], SGX integration [3], bpffs [4]. >From a quick review of the code, I don't see a new security hook being defined to cover these use cases. thanks, Mimi > > > > I've tended to aim these things at akpm if Al gets busy. (And since > > you've had past review from Al, that should be hopefully sufficient.) > > > > Thanks for chasing this! > > > > -Kees > >
