Re: [RFC PATCH 10/13] x86/uintr: Introduce user IPI sender syscalls

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On Mon, Sep 13 2021 at 13:01, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> +/*
> + * No lock is needed to read the active flag. Writes only happen from
> + * r_info->task that owns the UPID. Everyone else would just read this flag.
> + *
> + * This only provides a static check. The receiver may become inactive right
> + * after this check. The primary reason to have this check is to prevent future
> + * senders from connecting with this UPID, since the receiver task has already
> + * made this UPID inactive.

How is that not racy?

> +static void free_uitt(struct uintr_uitt_ctx *uitt_ctx)
> +{
> +	unsigned long flags;
> +
> +	spin_lock_irqsave(&uitt_ctx->uitt_lock, flags);
> +	kfree(uitt_ctx->uitt);

Again. Please move kfree() outside of the lock held region. But aside of
that what is this lock protecting here?

> +	uitt_ctx->uitt = NULL;
> +	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uitt_ctx->uitt_lock, flags);

If there is concurrency then the other task which is blocked on
uitt_lock will operate on uitt_ctx while the same is freed.

Again, this lacks any life time and serialization rules. Just sprinkling
locks all over the place does not make it magically correct.

> +	kfree(uitt_ctx);
> +}

> +static void put_uitt_ref(struct uintr_uitt_ctx *uitt_ctx)
> +{
> +	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&uitt_ctx->refs))
> +		free_uitt(uitt_ctx);
> +}


> +static struct uintr_uitt_ctx *get_uitt_ref(struct uintr_uitt_ctx *uitt_ctx)
> +{
> +	refcount_inc(&uitt_ctx->refs);
> +	return uitt_ctx;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void mark_uitte_invalid(struct uintr_sender_info *s_info)
> +{
> +	struct uintr_uitt_entry *uitte;
> +	unsigned long flags;
> +
> +	spin_lock_irqsave(&s_info->uitt_ctx->uitt_lock, flags);
> +	uitte = &s_info->uitt_ctx->uitt[s_info->uitt_index];
> +	uitte->valid = 0;
> +	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s_info->uitt_ctx->uitt_lock, flags);
> +}
> +
>  static void __clear_vector_from_upid(u64 uvec, struct uintr_upid *upid)
>  {
>  	clear_bit(uvec, (unsigned long *)&upid->puir);
> @@ -175,6 +290,210 @@ static void receiver_clear_uvec(struct callback_head *head)
>  	kfree(r_info);
>  }
>  
> +static void teardown_uitt(void)
> +{
> +	struct task_struct *t = current;
> +	struct fpu *fpu = &t->thread.fpu;
> +	u64 msr64;
> +
> +	put_uitt_ref(t->thread.ui_send->uitt_ctx);
> +	kfree(t->thread.ui_send);
> +	t->thread.ui_send = NULL;
> +
> +	fpregs_lock();
> +
> +	if (fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())) {
> +		/* Modify only the relevant bits of the MISC MSR */
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_UINTR_MISC, msr64);
> +		msr64 &= GENMASK_ULL(63, 32);

More magic numbers.

> +		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_UINTR_MISC, msr64);
> +		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_UINTR_TT, 0ULL);

> +static void __free_uitt_entry(unsigned int entry)
> +{
> +	struct task_struct *t = current;
> +	unsigned long flags;
> +
> +	if (entry >= UINTR_MAX_UITT_NR)
> +		return;
> +
> +	if (!is_uintr_sender(t))
> +		return;
> +
> +	pr_debug("send: Freeing UITTE entry %d for task=%d\n", entry, t->pid);
> +
> +	spin_lock_irqsave(&t->thread.ui_send->uitt_ctx->uitt_lock, flags);
> +	memset(&t->thread.ui_send->uitt_ctx->uitt[entry], 0,
> +	       sizeof(struct uintr_uitt_entry));
> +	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->thread.ui_send->uitt_ctx->uitt_lock,
> flags);

What's the spinlock protecting here?

> +	clear_bit(entry, (unsigned long *)t->thread.ui_send->uitt_mask);
> +
> +	if (is_uitt_empty(t)) {
> +		pr_debug("send: UITT mask is empty. Dereference and teardown UITT\n");
> +		teardown_uitt();
> +	}
> +}

> +void do_uintr_unregister_sender(struct uintr_receiver_info *r_info,
> +				struct uintr_sender_info *s_info)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * To make sure any new senduipi result in a #GP fault.
> +	 * The task work might take non-zero time to kick the process out.

-ENOPARSE

> +	 */
> +	mark_uitte_invalid(s_info);
> +
> +	pr_debug("send: Adding Free UITTE %d task work for task=%d\n",
> +		 s_info->uitt_index, s_info->task->pid);
> +
> +	init_task_work(&s_info->twork, sender_free_uitte);
> +	ret = task_work_add(s_info->task, &s_info->twork, true);
> +	if (ret) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Dereferencing the UITT and UPID here since the task has
> +		 * exited.
> +		 */
> +		pr_debug("send: Free UITTE %d task=%d has already exited\n",
> +			 s_info->uitt_index, s_info->task->pid);
> +		put_upid_ref(s_info->r_upid_ctx);
> +		put_uitt_ref(s_info->uitt_ctx);
> +		put_task_struct(s_info->task);
> +		kfree(s_info);
> +		return;
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +int do_uintr_register_sender(struct uintr_receiver_info *r_info,
> +			     struct uintr_sender_info *s_info)
> +{
> +	struct uintr_uitt_entry *uitte = NULL;
> +	struct uintr_sender *ui_send;
> +	struct task_struct *t = current;
> +	unsigned long flags;
> +	int entry;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Only a static check. Receiver could exit anytime after this check.
> +	 * This check only prevents connections using uintr_fd after the
> +	 * receiver has already exited/unregistered.
> +	 */
> +	if (!uintr_is_receiver_active(r_info))
> +		return -ESHUTDOWN;

How is this safe against a concurrent unregister/exit operation?

Thanks,

        tglx



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