On Thu, Jul 23, 2020 at 07:12:24PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, openat2(2) may be subject to > additional restrictions depending on a security policy managed by the > kernel through a sysctl or implemented by an LSM thanks to the > inode_permission hook. This new flag is ignored by open(2) and > openat(2) because of their unspecified flags handling. When used with > openat2(2), the default behavior is only to forbid to open a directory. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it looks like you are introducing a magical flag that would mean "let the Linux S&M take an extra special whip for this open()". Why is it done during open? If the caller is passing it deliberately, why not have an explicit request to apply given torture device to an already opened file? Why not sys_masochism(int fd, char *hurt_flavour), for that matter?
