Re: [RFC PATCH v14 00/10] Landlock LSM

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On 17/03/2020 20:45, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 17, 2020 at 6:50 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 17/03/2020 17:19, Jann Horn wrote:
>>> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 12:38 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> On 10/03/2020 00:44, Jann Horn wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 5:03 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>>>> Aside from those things, there is also a major correctness issue where
>>>>> I'm not sure how to solve it properly:
>>>>>
>>>>> Let's say a process installs a filter on itself like this:
>>>>>
>>>>> struct landlock_attr_ruleset ruleset = { .handled_access_fs =
>>>>> ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE};
>>>>> int ruleset_fd = landlock(LANDLOCK_CMD_CREATE_RULESET,
>>>>> LANDLOCK_OPT_CREATE_RULESET, sizeof(ruleset), &ruleset);
>>>>> struct landlock_attr_path_beneath path_beneath = {
>>>>>   .ruleset_fd = ruleset_fd,
>>>>>   .allowed_access = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE,
>>>>>   .parent_fd = open("/tmp/foobar", O_PATH),
>>>>> };
>>>>> landlock(LANDLOCK_CMD_ADD_RULE, LANDLOCK_OPT_ADD_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
>>>>> sizeof(path_beneath), &path_beneath);
>>>>> prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
>>>>> struct landlock_attr_enforce attr_enforce = { .ruleset_fd = ruleset_fd };
>>>>> landlock(LANDLOCK_CMD_ENFORCE_RULESET, LANDLOCK_OPT_ENFORCE_RULESET,
>>>>> sizeof(attr_enforce), &attr_enforce);
>>>>>
>>>>> At this point, the process is not supposed to be able to write to
>>>>> anything outside /tmp/foobar, right? But what happens if the process
>>>>> does the following next?
>>>>>
>>>>> struct landlock_attr_ruleset ruleset = { .handled_access_fs =
>>>>> ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE};
>>>>> int ruleset_fd = landlock(LANDLOCK_CMD_CREATE_RULESET,
>>>>> LANDLOCK_OPT_CREATE_RULESET, sizeof(ruleset), &ruleset);
>>>>> struct landlock_attr_path_beneath path_beneath = {
>>>>>   .ruleset_fd = ruleset_fd,
>>>>>   .allowed_access = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE,
>>>>>   .parent_fd = open("/", O_PATH),
>>>>> };
>>>>> landlock(LANDLOCK_CMD_ADD_RULE, LANDLOCK_OPT_ADD_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
>>>>> sizeof(path_beneath), &path_beneath);
>>>>> prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
>>>>> struct landlock_attr_enforce attr_enforce = { .ruleset_fd = ruleset_fd };
>>>>> landlock(LANDLOCK_CMD_ENFORCE_RULESET, LANDLOCK_OPT_ENFORCE_RULESET,
>>>>> sizeof(attr_enforce), &attr_enforce);
>>>>>
>>>>> As far as I can tell from looking at the source, after this, you will
>>>>> have write access to the entire filesystem again. I think the idea is
>>>>> that LANDLOCK_CMD_ENFORCE_RULESET should only let you drop privileges,
>>>>> not increase them, right?
>>>>
>>>> There is an additionnal check in syscall.c:get_path_from_fd(): it is
>>>> forbidden to add a rule with a path which is not accessible (according
>>>> to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPEN) thanks to a call to security_file_open(),
>>>> but this is definitely not perfect.
>>>
>>> Ah, I missed that.
>>>
>>>>> I think the easy way to fix this would be to add a bitmask to each
>>>>> rule that says from which ruleset it originally comes, and then let
>>>>> check_access_path() collect these bitmasks from each rule with OR, and
>>>>> check at the end whether the resulting bitmask is full - if not, at
>>>>> least one of the rulesets did not permit the access, and it should be
>>>>> denied.
>>>>>
>>>>> But maybe it would make more sense to change how the API works
>>>>> instead, and get rid of the concept of "merging" two rulesets
>>>>> together? Instead, we could make the API work like this:
>>>>>
>>>>>  - LANDLOCK_CMD_CREATE_RULESET gives you a file descriptor whose
>>>>> ->private_data contains a pointer to the old ruleset of the process,
>>>>> as well as a pointer to a new empty ruleset.
>>>>>  - LANDLOCK_CMD_ADD_RULE fails if the specified rule would not be
>>>>> permitted by the old ruleset, then adds the rule to the new ruleset
>>>>>  - LANDLOCK_CMD_ENFORCE_RULESET fails if the old ruleset pointer in
>>>>> ->private_data doesn't match the current ruleset of the process, then
>>>>> replaces the old ruleset with the new ruleset.
>>>>>
>>>>> With this, the new ruleset is guaranteed to be a subset of the old
>>>>> ruleset because each of the new ruleset's rules is permitted by the
>>>>> old ruleset. (Unless the directory hierarchy rotates, but in that case
>>>>> the inaccuracy isn't much worse than what would've been possible
>>>>> through RCU path walk anyway AFAIK.)
>>>>>
>>>>> What do you think?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I would prefer to add the same checks you described at first (with
>>>> check_access_path), but only when creating a new ruleset with
>>>> merge_ruleset() (which should probably be renamed). This enables not to
>>>> rely on a parent ruleset/domain until the enforcement, which is the case
>>>> anyway.
>>>> Unfortunately this doesn't work for some cases with bind mounts. Because
>>>> check_access_path() goes through one path, another (bind mounted) path
>>>> could be illegitimately allowed.
>>>
>>> Hmm... I'm not sure what you mean. At the moment, landlock doesn't
>>> allow any sandboxed process to change the mount hierarchy, right? Can
>>> you give an example where this would go wrong?
>>
>> Indeed, a Landlocked process must no be able to change its mount
>> namespace layout. However, bind mounts may already exist.
>> Let's say a process sandbox itself to only access /a in a read-write
>> way.
> 
> So, first policy:
> 
> /a RW
> 
>> Then, this process (or one of its children) add a new restriction
>> on /a/b to only be able to read this hierarchy.
> 
> You mean with the second policy looking like this?

Right.

> 
> /a RW
> /a/b R
> 
> Then the resulting policy would be:
> 
> /a RW policy_bitmask=0x00000003 (bits 0 and 1 set)
> /a/b R policy_bitmask=0x00000002 (bit 1 set)
> required_bits=0x00000003 (bits 0 and 1 set)
> 
>> The check at insertion
>> time would allow this because this access right is a subset of the
>> access right allowed with the parent directory. However, If /a/b is bind
>> mounted somewhere else, let's say in /private/b, then the second
>> enforcement just gave new access rights to this hierarchy too.
> 
> But with the solution I proposed, landlock's path walk would see
> something like this when accessing a file at /private/b/foo:
> /private/b/foo <no rules>
>   policies seen until now: 0x00000000
> /private/b <access: R, policy_bitmask=0x00000002>
>   policies seen until now: 0x00000002
> /private <no rules>
>   policies seen until now: 0x00000002
> / <no rules>
>   policies seen until now: 0x00000002
> 
> It wouldn't encounter any rule from the first policy, so the OR of the
> seen policy bitmasks would be 0x00000002, which is not the required
> value 0x00000003, and so the access would be denied.
As I understand your proposition, we need to build the required_bits
when adding a rule or enforcing/merging a ruleset with a domain. The
issue is that a rule only refers to a struct inode, not a struct path.
For your proposition to work, we would need to walk through the file
path when adding a rule to a ruleset, which means that we need to depend
of the current view of the process (i.e. its mount namespace), and its
Landlock domain. If the required_bits field is set when the ruleset is
merged with the domain, it is not possible anymore to walk through the
corresponding initial file path, which makes the enforcement step too
late to check for such consistency. The important point is that a
ruleset/domain doesn't have a notion of file hierarchy, a ruleset is
only a set of tagged inodes.

I'm not sure I got your proposition right, though. When and how would
you generate the required_bits?

Here is my updated proposition: add a layer level and a depth to each
rule (once enforced/merged with a domain), and a top layer level for a
domain. When enforcing a ruleset (i.e. merging a ruleset into the
current domain), the layer level of a new rule would be the incremented
top layer level. If there is no rule (from this domain) tied to the same
inode, then the depth of the new rule is 1. However, if there is already
a rule tied to the same inode and if this rule's layer level is the
previous top layer level, then the depth and the layer level are both
incremented and the rule is updated with the new access rights (boolean
AND).

The policy looks like this:
domain top_layer=2
/a RW policy_bitmask=0x00000003 layer=1 depth=1
/a/b R policy_bitmask=0x00000002 layer=2 depth=1

The path walk access check walks through all inodes and start with a
layer counter equal to the top layer of the current domain. For each
encountered inode tied to a rule, the access rights are checked and a
new check ensures that the layer of the matching rule is the same as the
counter (this may be a merged ruleset containing rules pertaining to the
same hierarchy, which is fine) or equal to the decremented counter (i.e.
the path walk just reached the underlying layer). If the path walk
encounter a rule with a layer strictly less than the counter minus one,
there is a whole in the layers which means that the ruleset
hierarchy/subset does not match, and the access must be denied.

When accessing a file at /private/b/foo for a read access:
/private/b/foo <no rules>
  allowed_access=unknown layer_counter=2
/private/b <access: R, policy_bitmask=0x00000002, layer=2, depth=1>
  allowed_access=allowed layer_counter=2
/private <no rules>
  allowed_access=allowed layer_counter=2
/ <no rules>
  allowed_access=allowed layer_counter=2

Because the layer_counter didn't reach 1, the access request is then denied.

This proposition enables not to rely on a parent ruleset at first, only
when enforcing/merging a ruleset with a domain. This also solves the
issue with multiple inherited/nested rules on the same inode (in which
case the depth just grows). Moreover, this enables to safely stop the
path walk as soon as we reach the layer 1.

Here is a more complex example. A process sandbox itself with a first rule:
domain top_layer=1
/a RW policy_bitmask=0x00000003 layer=1 depth=1

Then the sandbox process enforces to itself this second (useless) ruleset:
/a/b RW policy_bitmask=0x00000003

The resulting domain is then:
domain top_layer=2
/a RW policy_bitmask=0x00000003 layer=1 depth=1
/a/b RW policy_bitmask=0x00000003 layer=2 depth=1

Then the sandbox process enforces to itself this third ruleset (which
effectively reduces its access):
/a/b R policy_bitmask=0x00000002

The resulting domain is then:
domain top_layer=3
/a RW policy_bitmask=0x00000003 layer=1 depth=1
/a/b R policy_bitmask=0x00000002 layer=3 depth=2

At this time, only /a/b is accessible in a read way. The access rights
on /a are ignored (but still inherited).

Then the sandbox process enforces to itself this fourth ruleset:
/c R policy_bitmask=0x00000002

The resulting domain is then:
domain top_layer=4
/a RW policy_bitmask=0x00000003 layer=1 depth=1
/a/b R policy_bitmask=0x00000002 layer=3 depth=2
/c R policy_bitmask=0x00000002 layer=4 depth=1

Now, every read or write access requests will be denied.

Then the sandbox process enforces to itself this fifth ruleset:
/a R policy_bitmask=0x00000002

Because /a is not in a contiguous underneath layer, the resulting domain
is unchanged (except the top_layer which may be incremented anyway).
Of course, we must check that the top_layer is not overflowing, in which
case an error must be returned to inform userspace that the ruleset
can't be enforced.



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