Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf

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On Thursday, August 15, 2019 11:08 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 11:36:43AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 10:29 AM Alexei Starovoitov
> > alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 11:24:54AM +0000, Jordan Glover wrote:
> > >
> > > > systemd --user processes aren't "less privileged". The are COMPLETELY unprivileged.
> > > > Granting them cap_bpf is the same as granting it to every other unprivileged user
> > > > process. Also unprivileged user process can start systemd --user process with any
> > > > command they like.
> > >
> > > systemd itself is trusted. It's the same binary whether it runs as pid=1
> > > or as pid=123. One of the use cases is to make IPAddressDeny= work with --user.
> > > Subset of that feature already works with AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN.
> > > CAP_BPF is a natural step in the same direction.
> >
> > I have the feeling that we're somehow speaking different languages.
> > What, precisely, do you mean when you say "systemd itself is trusted"?
> > Do you mean "the administrator trusts that the /lib/systemd/systemd
> > binary is not malicious"? Do you mean "the administrator trusts that
> > the running systemd process is not malicious"?
>
> please see
> https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/4c1567f29aeb60a6741874bca8a8e3a0bd69ed01
> I'm not advocating for or against this approach.
> Call it 'security hole' or 'better security'.
> There are two categories of people for any feature like this.
> My point that there is a demand to use bpf for non-root and CAP_NET_ADMIN
> level of privileges is acceptable.
> Another option is to relax all of bpf to CAP_NET_ADMIN instead of CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> But CAP_BPF is clearly better way.
>

Do you realize it's not possible to grant CAP_NET_ADMIN or any other CAP in
"systemd --user" service? Trying to do so will fail with:
"Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): Operation not permitted"

I think it's crucial to clear that point to avoid confusion in this discussion
where people are talking about different things.

On the other hand running "systemd --system" service with:

User=nobody
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN

is perfectly legit and clears some security concerns as only privileged user
can start such service.

Jordan




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