On 05/08/2019 01:55, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:43 AM Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> On Wed 12-12-18 09:17:08, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >>> When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, sys_open() may be subject to >>> additional restrictions depending on a security policy implemented by an >>> LSM through the inode_permission hook. >>> >>> The underlying idea is to be able to restrict scripts interpretation >>> according to a policy defined by the system administrator. For this to >>> be possible, script interpreters must use the O_MAYEXEC flag >>> appropriately. To be fully effective, these interpreters also need to >>> handle the other ways to execute code (for which the kernel can't help): >>> command line parameters (e.g., option -e for Perl), module loading >>> (e.g., option -m for Python), stdin, file sourcing, environment >>> variables, configuration files... According to the threat model, it may >>> be acceptable to allow some script interpreters (e.g. Bash) to interpret >>> commands from stdin, may it be a TTY or a pipe, because it may not be >>> enough to (directly) perform syscalls. >>> >>> A simple security policy implementation is available in a following >>> patch for Yama. >>> >>> This is an updated subset of the patch initially written by Vincent >>> Strubel for CLIP OS: >>> https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch >>> This patch has been used for more than 10 years with customized script >>> interpreters. Some examples can be found here: >>> https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> >>> Signed-off-by: Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@xxxxxxxxxxx> >>> Signed-off-by: Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@xxxxxxxxxxx> >>> Reviewed-by: Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@xxxxxxxxxxx> >>> Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> >>> Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@xxxxxxxxxxx> >> >> ... >> >>> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c >>> index 0285ce7dbd51..75479b79a58f 100644 >>> --- a/fs/open.c >>> +++ b/fs/open.c >>> @@ -974,6 +974,10 @@ static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, umode_t mode, struct open_flags *o >>> if (flags & O_APPEND) >>> acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND; >>> >>> + /* Check execution permissions on open. */ >>> + if (flags & O_MAYEXEC) >>> + acc_mode |= MAY_OPENEXEC; >>> + >>> op->acc_mode = acc_mode; >>> >>> op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN; >> >> I don't feel experienced enough in security to tell whether we want this >> functionality or not. But if we do this, shouldn't we also set FMODE_EXEC >> on the resulting struct file? That way also security_file_open() can be >> used to arbitrate such executable opens and in particular >> fanotify permission event FAN_OPEN_EXEC will get properly generated which I >> guess is desirable (support for it is sitting in my tree waiting for the >> merge window) - adding some audit people involved in FAN_OPEN_EXEC to >> CC. Just an idea... >> > > I would really like to land this patch. I'm fiddling with making > bpffs handle permissions intelligently, and the lack of a way to say > "hey, I want to open this bpf program so that I can run it" is > annoying. Are you OK with this series? What about Aleksa's work on openat2(), and Sean's work on SGX/noexec? Is it time to send a new patch series (with a dedicated LSM instead of Yama)?
