On Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 10:22 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 6:21 PM Matthew Garrett > <matthewgarrett@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > > +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { > > [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", > > [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", > > [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", > > + [LOCKDOWN_BPF] = "use of bpf", > > [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", > > The text here says "use of bpf", but what this patch is *really* doing > is locking down use of BPF to read kernel memory. If the details > change, then every LSM needs to get updated, and we risk breaking user > policies that are based on LSMs that offer excessively fine > granularity. The text is descriptive rather than normative, and no changes should be made that alter the semantics of a reason - it makes more sense to just add another reason. > I'd be more comfortable if the LSM only got to see "confidentiality" > or "integrity". If LSM authors can be trusted to do the right thing here, then I see no problem in providing additional data. I'm happy to defer to James on that.