On Thu, 28 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 8:15 PM James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > OTOH, this seems like a combination of mechanism and policy. The 3 modes > > are a help here, but I wonder if they may be too coarse grained still, > > e.g. if someone wants to allow a specific mechanism according to their own > > threat model and mitigations. > > In general the interfaces blocked by these patches could also be > blocked with an LSM, and I'd guess that people with more fine-grained > requirements would probably take that approach. So... I have to ask, why not use LSM for this in the first place? Either with an existing module or perhaps a lockdown LSM? > > > Secure boot gives you some assurance of the static state of the system at > > boot time, and lockdown is certainly useful (with or without secure boot), > > but it's not a complete solution to runtime kernel integrity protection by > > any stretch of the imagination. I'm concerned about it being perceived as > > such. > > What do you think the functionality gaps are in terms of ensuring > kernel integrity (other than kernel flaws that allow the restrictions > to be bypassed)? I don't know of any non-flaw gaps. -- James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
