----- On Jan 28, 2019, at 5:39 PM, paulmck paulmck@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote: > On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 05:07:07PM -0500, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote: >> Jann Horn identified a racy access to p->mm in the global expedited >> command of the membarrier system call. >> >> The suggested fix is to hold the task_lock() around the accesses to >> p->mm and to the mm_struct membarrier_state field to guarantee the >> existence of the mm_struct. >> >> Link: >> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez2G8ctF8dHS42TF37pThfr3y0RNOOYTmxvACm4u8Yu3cw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx >> Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@xxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Tested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@xxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Avi Kivity <avi@xxxxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@xxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Dave Watson <davejwatson@xxxxxx> >> CC: David Sehr <sehr@xxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Maged Michael <maged.michael@xxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Michael Ellerman <mpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Paul Mackerras <paulus@xxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Russell King <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> CC: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx> >> CC: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx # v4.16+ >> CC: linux-api@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx >> --- >> kernel/sched/membarrier.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------ >> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/kernel/sched/membarrier.c b/kernel/sched/membarrier.c >> index 76e0eaf4654e..305fdcc4c5f7 100644 >> --- a/kernel/sched/membarrier.c >> +++ b/kernel/sched/membarrier.c >> @@ -81,12 +81,27 @@ static int membarrier_global_expedited(void) >> >> rcu_read_lock(); >> p = task_rcu_dereference(&cpu_rq(cpu)->curr); >> - if (p && p->mm && (atomic_read(&p->mm->membarrier_state) & >> - MEMBARRIER_STATE_GLOBAL_EXPEDITED)) { >> - if (!fallback) >> - __cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, tmpmask); >> - else >> - smp_call_function_single(cpu, ipi_mb, NULL, 1); >> + /* >> + * Skip this CPU if the runqueue's current task is NULL or if >> + * it is a kernel thread. >> + */ >> + if (p && READ_ONCE(p->mm)) { >> + bool mm_match; >> + >> + /* >> + * Read p->mm and access membarrier_state while holding >> + * the task lock to ensure existence of mm. >> + */ >> + task_lock(p); >> + mm_match = p->mm && (atomic_read(&p->mm->membarrier_state) & > > Are we guaranteed that this p->mm will be the same as the one loaded via > READ_ONCE() above? Either way, wouldn't it be better to READ_ONCE() it a > single time and use the same value everywhere? The first "READ_ONCE()" above is _outside_ of the task_lock() critical section. Those two accesses _can_ load two different pointers, and this is why we need to re-read the p->mm pointer within the task_lock() critical section to ensure existence of the mm_struct that we use. If we move the READ_ONCE() into the task_lock(), we need to uselessly take a lock before we can skip kernel threads. If we lead the READ_ONCE() outside the task_lock(), then p->mm can be updated between the READ_ONCE() and reference to the mm_struct content within the task_lock(), which is racy and does not guarantee its existence. Or am I missing your point ? Thanks, Mathieu > > Thanx, Paul > >> + MEMBARRIER_STATE_GLOBAL_EXPEDITED); >> + task_unlock(p); >> + if (mm_match) { >> + if (!fallback) >> + __cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, tmpmask); >> + else >> + smp_call_function_single(cpu, ipi_mb, NULL, 1); >> + } >> } >> rcu_read_unlock(); >> } >> -- >> 2.17.1 -- Mathieu Desnoyers EfficiOS Inc. http://www.efficios.com