On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 03:43:06PM +0100, Jan Kara wrote: > > When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, sys_open() may be subject to > > additional restrictions depending on a security policy implemented by an > > LSM through the inode_permission hook. > > > > The underlying idea is to be able to restrict scripts interpretation > > according to a policy defined by the system administrator. For this to > > be possible, script interpreters must use the O_MAYEXEC flag > > appropriately. To be fully effective, these interpreters also need to > > handle the other ways to execute code (for which the kernel can't help): > > command line parameters (e.g., option -e for Perl), module loading > > (e.g., option -m for Python), stdin, file sourcing, environment > > variables, configuration files... According to the threat model, it may > > be acceptable to allow some script interpreters (e.g. Bash) to interpret > > commands from stdin, may it be a TTY or a pipe, because it may not be > > enough to (directly) perform syscalls. > > > > A simple security policy implementation is available in a following > > patch for Yama. > > > > This is an updated subset of the patch initially written by Vincent > > Strubel for CLIP OS: > > https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch > > This patch has been used for more than 10 years with customized script > > interpreters. Some examples can be found here: > > https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC > > > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> > > Signed-off-by: Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@xxxxxxxxxxx> > > Signed-off-by: Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@xxxxxxxxxxx> > > Reviewed-by: Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@xxxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@xxxxxxxxxxx> > > ... > > > diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c > > index 0285ce7dbd51..75479b79a58f 100644 > > --- a/fs/open.c > > +++ b/fs/open.c > > @@ -974,6 +974,10 @@ static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, umode_t mode, struct open_flags *o > > if (flags & O_APPEND) > > acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND; > > > > + /* Check execution permissions on open. */ > > + if (flags & O_MAYEXEC) > > + acc_mode |= MAY_OPENEXEC; > > + > > op->acc_mode = acc_mode; > > > > op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN; > > I don't feel experienced enough in security to tell whether we want this > functionality or not. But if we do this, shouldn't we also set FMODE_EXEC > on the resulting struct file? That way also security_file_open() can be > used to arbitrate such executable opens and in particular > fanotify permission event FAN_OPEN_EXEC will get properly generated which I > guess is desirable (support for it is sitting in my tree waiting for the > merge window) - adding some audit people involved in FAN_OPEN_EXEC to > CC. Just an idea... If I'm understanding this patch series correctly, without an enforced LSM policy there's realistically no added benefit from a security perspective, right? Also, I'm in agreement with what Jan has mentioned in regards to setting the __FMODE_EXEC flag when O_MAYEXEC has been specified. This is something that would work quite nicely in conjunction with some of the new file access notification events. Rather than setting it on the resulting struct file, couldn't they simply incorporate it as part of op->open_flags when flags & O_MAYEXEC? Not entirely sure whether this is what you actually meant or not though? Pretty much the same as a call to exec(2)/execat(2) when it builds its open_flags. -- Matthew Bobrowski
