Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Le 12/12/2018 à 15:43, Jan Kara a écrit :
> On Wed 12-12-18 09:17:08, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, sys_open() may be subject to
>> additional restrictions depending on a security policy implemented by an
>> LSM through the inode_permission hook.
>>
>> The underlying idea is to be able to restrict scripts interpretation
>> according to a policy defined by the system administrator.  For this to
>> be possible, script interpreters must use the O_MAYEXEC flag
>> appropriately.  To be fully effective, these interpreters also need to
>> handle the other ways to execute code (for which the kernel can't help):
>> command line parameters (e.g., option -e for Perl), module loading
>> (e.g., option -m for Python), stdin, file sourcing, environment
>> variables, configuration files...  According to the threat model, it may
>> be acceptable to allow some script interpreters (e.g. Bash) to interpret
>> commands from stdin, may it be a TTY or a pipe, because it may not be
>> enough to (directly) perform syscalls.
>>
>> A simple security policy implementation is available in a following
>> patch for Yama.
>>
>> This is an updated subset of the patch initially written by Vincent
>> Strubel for CLIP OS:
>> https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch
>> This patch has been used for more than 10 years with customized script
>> interpreters.  Some examples can be found here:
>> https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Reviewed-by: Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> ...
> 
>> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
>> index 0285ce7dbd51..75479b79a58f 100644
>> --- a/fs/open.c
>> +++ b/fs/open.c
>> @@ -974,6 +974,10 @@ static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, umode_t mode, struct open_flags *o
>>  	if (flags & O_APPEND)
>>  		acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
>>  
>> +	/* Check execution permissions on open. */
>> +	if (flags & O_MAYEXEC)
>> +		acc_mode |= MAY_OPENEXEC;
>> +
>>  	op->acc_mode = acc_mode;
>>  
>>  	op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN;
> 
> I don't feel experienced enough in security to tell whether we want this
> functionality or not. But if we do this, shouldn't we also set FMODE_EXEC
> on the resulting struct file? That way also security_file_open() can be
> used to arbitrate such executable opens and in particular
> fanotify permission event FAN_OPEN_EXEC will get properly generated which I
> guess is desirable (support for it is sitting in my tree waiting for the
> merge window) - adding some audit people involved in FAN_OPEN_EXEC to
> CC. Just an idea...

Indeed, it may be useful for other LSM.

 Mickaël



[Index of Archives]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]

  Powered by Linux