On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 10:24 AM Tycho Andersen <tycho@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> This patch introduces a means for syscalls matched in seccomp to notify
> some other task that a particular filter has been triggered.
>
> The motivation for this is primarily for use with containers. For example,
> if a container does an init_module(), we obviously don't want to load this
> untrusted code, which may be compiled for the wrong version of the kernel
> anyway. Instead, we could parse the module image, figure out which module
> the container is trying to load and load it on the host.
>
> As another example, containers cannot mount() in general since various
> filesystems assume a trusted image. However, if an orchestrator knows that
> e.g. a particular block device has not been exposed to a container for
> writing, it want to allow the container to mount that block device (that
> is, handle the mount for it).
>
> This patch adds functionality that is already possible via at least two
> other means that I know about, both of which involve ptrace(): first, one
> could ptrace attach, and then iterate through syscalls via PTRACE_SYSCALL.
> Unfortunately this is slow, so a faster version would be to install a
> filter that does SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, which triggers a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP.
> Since ptrace allows only one tracer, if the container runtime is that
> tracer, users inside the container (or outside) trying to debug it will not
> be able to use ptrace, which is annoying. It also means that older
> distributions based on Upstart cannot boot inside containers using ptrace,
> since upstart itself uses ptrace to monitor services while starting.
>
> The actual implementation of this is fairly small, although getting the
> synchronization right was/is slightly complex.
>
> Finally, it's worth noting that the classic seccomp TOCTOU of reading
> memory data from the task still applies here, but can be avoided with
> careful design of the userspace handler: if the userspace handler reads all
> of the task memory that is necessary before applying its security policy,
> the tracee's subsequent memory edits will not be read by the tracer.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@xxxxxxxx>
> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Christian Brauner <christian@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
This takes care of everything I mentioned (and has incorporated LOTS
of people's suggestions), so I think it's ready for -next. I've
applied this and am doing local testing now.
Thanks for keeping with this!
-Kees
> ---
> v2: * make id a u64; the idea here being that it will never overflow,
> because 64 is huge (one syscall every nanosecond => wrap every 584
> years) (Andy)
> * prevent nesting of user notifications: if someone is already attached
> the tree in one place, nobody else can attach to the tree (Andy)
> * notify the listener of signals the tracee receives as well (Andy)
> * implement poll
> v3: * lockdep fix (Oleg)
> * drop unnecessary WARN()s (Christian)
> * rearrange error returns to be more rpetty (Christian)
> * fix build in !CONFIG_SECCOMP_USER_NOTIFICATION case
> v4: * fix implementation of poll to use poll_wait() (Jann)
> * change listener's fd flags to be 0 (Jann)
> * hoist filter initialization out of ifdefs to its own function
> init_user_notification()
> * add some more testing around poll() and closing the listener while a
> syscall is in action
> * s/GET_LISTENER/NEW_LISTENER, since you can't _get_ a listener, but it
> creates a new one (Matthew)
> * correctly handle pid namespaces, add some testcases (Matthew)
> * use EINPROGRESS instead of EINVAL when a notification response is
> written twice (Matthew)
> * fix comment typo from older version (SEND vs READ) (Matthew)
> * whitespace and logic simplification (Tobin)
> * add some Documentation/ bits on userspace trapping
> v5: * fix documentation typos (Jann)
> * add signalled field to struct seccomp_notif (Jann)
> * switch to using ioctls instead of read()/write() for struct passing
> (Jann)
> * add an ioctl to ensure an id is still valid
> v6: * docs typo fixes, update docs for ioctl() change (Christian)
> v7: * switch struct seccomp_knotif's id member to a u64 (derp :)
> * use notify_lock in IS_ID_VALID query to avoid racing
> * s/signalled/signaled (Tyler)
> * fix docs to reflect that ids are not globally unique (Tyler)
> * add a test to check -ERESTARTSYS behavior (Tyler)
> * drop CONFIG_SECCOMP_USER_NOTIFICATION (Tyler)
> * reorder USER_NOTIF in seccomp return codes list (Tyler)
> * return size instead of sizeof(struct user_notif) (Tyler)
> * ENOENT instead of EINVAL when invalid id is passed (Tyler)
> * drop CONFIG_SECCOMP_USER_NOTIFICATION guards (Tyler)
> * s/IS_ID_VALID/ID_VALID and switch ioctl to be "well behaved" (Tyler)
> * add a new struct notification to minimize the additions to
> struct seccomp_filter, also pack the necessary additions a bit more
> cleverly (Tyler)
> * switch to keeping track of the task itself instead of the pid (we'll
> use this for implementing PUT_FD)
> v8: * in recv, don't copy_to_user() while holding notify lock, in case
> userfaultfd blocks and causes all syscalls to block (Kees)
> * switch ioctl character to something more fun ! (Kees)
> * switch ioctl defines to use their own SECCOMP_IO* macros (Kees)
> * rename seccomp ioctls to be SECCOMP_IOCTL_* (Kees)
> * move comment of notify_lock to the right place (Jann)
> * drop comment abount reference count bounding in __get_seccomp_filter (Jann)
> * add lockdep_assert_held() in seccomp_next_notify_id() (Kees)
> * in seccomp_do_user_notification(), always increment semaphore before
> releasing lock, to prevent use after free of ->notif (Kees)
> * add another wake_up_poll() when a signal is received (Jann)
> * make all listener fds O_CLOEXEC (Jann/Kees)
> * use memset() instead of = {} initialization for structures (Kees)
> * move casting of buf pointer to ioctl, instead of in handler functions (Kees)
> * fix ENOENT testing in seccomp_notify_send() (Jann)
> * use ENOENT instead of -1 (EPERM) for ID_VALID ioctl (Jann)
> * use ()s around "nested" bit operations (Kees)
> * init struct notification members in the order they're declared (Jann)
> * rearrange things so no forward declaration of init_listener() is
> required (Kees)
> * switch to a flags based future-proofing mechanism for struct
> seccomp_notif and seccomp_notif_resp, thus avoiding version issues
> with structure length (Kees)
> * fix a memory leak in init_listener() in a failure case
> * fix a use-after-free of filter->notif in do_user_notification() when
> the listener fd is closed after a signal is sent
> * add a comment about semaphore state in the interrupt case in
> do_user_notification() + seccomp_notify_recv()
> v9: * add SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES to handle when struct seccomp_data
> changes in size
> * don't do locking all the way up the seccomp tree (Oleg)
> * rearrange the tests so that one test tests one thing
> * avoid an unkillable sleep by dropping the signaled flag (Oleg)
> ---
> Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt | 1 +
> .../userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst | 84 ++++
> include/linux/seccomp.h | 7 +-
> include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 40 +-
> kernel/seccomp.c | 448 +++++++++++++++++-
> tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 447 ++++++++++++++++-
> 6 files changed, 1017 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
> index af6f6ba1fe80..c9558146ac58 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
> @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ Code Seq#(hex) Include File Comments
> 0x1b all InfiniBand Subsystem <http://infiniband.sourceforge.net/>
> 0x20 all drivers/cdrom/cm206.h
> 0x22 all scsi/sg.h
> +'!' 00-1F uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> '#' 00-3F IEEE 1394 Subsystem Block for the entire subsystem
> '$' 00-0F linux/perf_counter.h, linux/perf_event.h
> '%' 00-0F include/uapi/linux/stm.h
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
> index 82a468bc7560..b1b846d8a094 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
> @@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ In precedence order, they are:
> Results in the lower 16-bits of the return value being passed
> to userland as the errno without executing the system call.
>
> +``SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF``:
> + Results in a ``struct seccomp_notif`` message sent on the userspace
> + notification fd, if it is attached, or ``-ENOSYS`` if it is not. See below
> + on discussion of how to handle user notifications.
> +
> ``SECCOMP_RET_TRACE``:
> When returned, this value will cause the kernel to attempt to
> notify a ``ptrace()``-based tracer prior to executing the system
> @@ -183,6 +188,85 @@ The ``samples/seccomp/`` directory contains both an x86-specific example
> and a more generic example of a higher level macro interface for BPF
> program generation.
>
> +Userspace Notification
> +======================
> +
> +The ``SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF`` return code lets seccomp filters pass a
> +particular syscall to userspace to be handled. This may be useful for
> +applications like container managers, which wish to intercept particular
> +syscalls (``mount()``, ``finit_module()``, etc.) and change their behavior.
> +
> +To acquire a notification FD, use the ``SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER``
> +argument to the ``seccomp()`` syscall:
> +
> +.. code-block:: c
> +
> + fd = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER, &prog);
> +
> +which (on success) will return a listener fd for the filter, which can then be
> +passed around via ``SCM_RIGHTS`` or similar. Note that filter fds correspond to
> +a particular filter, and not a particular task. So if this task then forks,
> +notifications from both tasks will appear on the same filter fd. Reads and
> +writes to/from a filter fd are also synchronized, so a filter fd can safely
> +have many readers.
> +
> +The interface for a seccomp notification fd consists of two structures:
> +
> +.. code-block:: c
> +
> + struct seccomp_notif_sizes {
> + __u16 seccomp_notif;
> + __u16 seccomp_notif_resp;
> + __u16 seccomp_data;
> + };
> +
> + struct seccomp_notif {
> + __u64 id;
> + __u32 pid;
> + __u32 flags;
> + struct seccomp_data data;
> + };
> +
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp {
> + __u64 id;
> + __s64 val;
> + __s32 error;
> + __u32 flags;
> + };
> +
> +The ``struct seccomp_notif_sizes`` structure can be used to determine the size
> +of the various structures used in seccomp notifications. The size of ``struct
> +seccomp_data`` may change in the future, so code should use:
> +
> +.. code-block:: c
> +
> + struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes;
> + seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes);
> +
> +to determine the size of the various structures to allocate. See
> +samples/seccomp/user-trap.c for an example.
> +
> +Users can read via ``ioctl(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV)`` (or ``poll()``) on a
> +seccomp notification fd to receive a ``struct seccomp_notif``, which contains
> +five members: the input length of the structure, a unique-per-filter ``id``,
> +the ``pid`` of the task which triggered this request (which may be 0 if the
> +task is in a pid ns not visible from the listener's pid namespace), a ``flags``
> +member which for now only has ``SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED``, representing
> +whether or not the notification is a result of a non-fatal signal, and the
> +``data`` passed to seccomp. Userspace can then make a decision based on this
> +information about what to do, and ``ioctl(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND)`` a
> +response, indicating what should be returned to userspace. The ``id`` member of
> +``struct seccomp_notif_resp`` should be the same ``id`` as in ``struct
> +seccomp_notif``.
> +
> +It is worth noting that ``struct seccomp_data`` contains the values of register
> +arguments to the syscall, but does not contain pointers to memory. The task's
> +memory is accessible to suitably privileged traces via ``ptrace()`` or
> +``/proc/pid/mem``. However, care should be taken to avoid the TOCTOU mentioned
> +above in this document: all arguments being read from the tracee's memory
> +should be read into the tracer's memory before any policy decisions are made.
> +This allows for an atomic decision on syscall arguments.
> +
> Sysctls
> =======
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> index b5103c019cf4..84868d37b35d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> @@ -4,9 +4,10 @@
>
> #include <uapi/linux/seccomp.h>
>
> -#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK (SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC | \
> - SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG | \
> - SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW)
> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK (SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC | \
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG | \
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW | \
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> index 9efc0e73d50b..90734aa5aa36 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> @@ -15,11 +15,13 @@
> #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
> #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
> #define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
> +#define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3
>
> /* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
> -#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
> -#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (1UL << 1)
> -#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2)
> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (1UL << 1)
> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2)
> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER (1UL << 3)
>
> /*
> * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
> @@ -35,6 +37,7 @@
> #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
> #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
> #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF 0x7fc00000U /* notifies userspace */
> #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
> #define SECCOMP_RET_LOG 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */
> #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
> @@ -60,4 +63,35 @@ struct seccomp_data {
> __u64 args[6];
> };
>
> +struct seccomp_notif_sizes {
> + __u16 seccomp_notif;
> + __u16 seccomp_notif_resp;
> + __u16 seccomp_data;
> +};
> +
> +struct seccomp_notif {
> + __u64 id;
> + __u32 pid;
> + __u32 flags;
> + struct seccomp_data data;
> +};
> +
> +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
> + __u64 id;
> + __s64 val;
> + __s32 error;
> + __u32 flags;
> +};
> +
> +#define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC '!'
> +#define SECCOMP_IO(nr) _IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type) _IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type) _IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type) _IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
> +
> +/* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */
> +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND SECCOMP_IOWR(1, \
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64)
> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 393e029f778a..15b6be97fc09 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -33,12 +33,74 @@
> #endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +#include <linux/file.h>
> #include <linux/filter.h>
> #include <linux/pid.h>
> #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/tracehook.h>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
> +
> +enum notify_state {
> + SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT,
> + SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT,
> + SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED,
> +};
> +
> +struct seccomp_knotif {
> + /* The struct pid of the task whose filter triggered the notification */
> + struct task_struct *task;
> +
> + /* The "cookie" for this request; this is unique for this filter. */
> + u64 id;
> +
> + /*
> + * The seccomp data. This pointer is valid the entire time this
> + * notification is active, since it comes from __seccomp_filter which
> + * eclipses the entire lifecycle here.
> + */
> + const struct seccomp_data *data;
> +
> + /*
> + * Notification states. When SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF is returned, a
> + * struct seccomp_knotif is created and starts out in INIT. Once the
> + * handler reads the notification off of an FD, it transitions to SENT.
> + * If a signal is received the state transitions back to INIT and
> + * another message is sent. When the userspace handler replies, state
> + * transitions to REPLIED.
> + */
> + enum notify_state state;
> +
> + /* The return values, only valid when in SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */
> + int error;
> + long val;
> +
> + /* Signals when this has entered SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */
> + struct completion ready;
> +
> + struct list_head list;
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * struct notification - container for seccomp userspace notifications. Since
> + * most seccomp filters will not have notification listeners attached and this
> + * structure is fairly large, we store the notification-specific stuff in a
> + * separate structure.
> + *
> + * @request: A semaphore that users of this notification can wait on for
> + * changes. Actual reads and writes are still controlled with
> + * filter->notify_lock.
> + * @next_id: The id of the next request.
> + * @notifications: A list of struct seccomp_knotif elements.
> + * @wqh: A wait queue for poll.
> + */
> +struct notification {
> + struct semaphore request;
> + u64 next_id;
> + struct list_head notifications;
> + wait_queue_head_t wqh;
> +};
>
> /**
> * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
> @@ -50,6 +112,8 @@
> * @log: true if all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW should be logged
> * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
> * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate
> + * @notif: the struct that holds all notification related information
> + * @notify_lock: A lock for all notification-related accesses.
> *
> * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
> * pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
> @@ -66,6 +130,8 @@ struct seccomp_filter {
> bool log;
> struct seccomp_filter *prev;
> struct bpf_prog *prog;
> + struct notification *notif;
> + struct mutex notify_lock;
> };
>
> /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
> @@ -386,6 +452,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
> if (!sfilter)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>
> + mutex_init(&sfilter->notify_lock);
> ret = bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter->prog, fprog,
> seccomp_check_filter, save_orig);
> if (ret < 0) {
> @@ -479,7 +546,6 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
>
> static void __get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> {
> - /* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
> refcount_inc(&filter->usage);
> }
>
> @@ -550,11 +616,13 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
> #define SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE (1 << 4)
> #define SECCOMP_LOG_LOG (1 << 5)
> #define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW (1 << 6)
> +#define SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF (1 << 7)
>
> static u32 seccomp_actions_logged = SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS |
> SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD |
> SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP |
> SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO |
> + SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF |
> SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE |
> SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;
>
> @@ -575,6 +643,9 @@ static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action,
> case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
> log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE;
> break;
> + case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
> + log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF;
> + break;
> case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
> log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;
> break;
> @@ -646,6 +717,68 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> #else
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +static u64 seccomp_next_notify_id(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Note: overflow is ok here, the id just needs to be unique per
> + * filter.
> + */
> + lockdep_assert_held(&filter->notify_lock);
> + return filter->notif->next_id++;
> +}
> +
> +static void seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall,
> + struct seccomp_filter *match,
> + const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> +{
> + int err;
> + long ret = 0;
> + struct seccomp_knotif n = {};
> +
> + mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
> + err = -ENOSYS;
> + if (!match->notif)
> + goto out;
> +
> + n.task = current;
> + n.state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT;
> + n.data = sd;
> + n.id = seccomp_next_notify_id(match);
> + init_completion(&n.ready);
> + list_add(&n.list, &match->notif->notifications);
> +
> + up(&match->notif->request);
> + wake_up_poll(&match->notif->wqh, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
> + mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
> +
> + /*
> + * This is where we wait for a reply from userspace.
> + */
> + err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);
> + mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
> + if (err == 0) {
> + ret = n.val;
> + err = n.error;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Note that it's possible the listener died in between the time when
> + * we were notified of a respons (or a signal) and when we were able to
> + * re-acquire the lock, so only delete from the list if the
> + * notification actually exists.
> + *
> + * Also note that this test is only valid because there's no way to
> + * *reattach* to a notifier right now. If one is added, we'll need to
> + * keep track of the notif itself and make sure they match here.
> + */
> + if (match->notif)
> + list_del(&n.list);
> +out:
> + mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
> + syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
> + err, ret);
> +}
> +
> static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> const bool recheck_after_trace)
> {
> @@ -728,6 +861,10 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
>
> return 0;
>
> + case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
> + seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, sd);
> + goto skip;
> +
> case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
> seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true);
> return 0;
> @@ -834,6 +971,263 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
> }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +static int seccomp_notify_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
> + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
> +
> + /*
> + * If this file is being closed because e.g. the task who owned it
> + * died, let's wake everyone up who was waiting on us.
> + */
> + list_for_each_entry(knotif, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> + if (knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED)
> + continue;
> +
> + knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED;
> + knotif->error = -ENOSYS;
> + knotif->val = 0;
> +
> + complete(&knotif->ready);
> + }
> +
> + kfree(filter->notif);
> + filter->notif = NULL;
> + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
> + __put_seccomp_filter(filter);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static long seccomp_notify_recv(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
> + void __user *buf)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur;
> + struct seccomp_notif unotif;
> + ssize_t ret;
> +
> + memset(&unotif, 0, sizeof(unotif));
> +
> + ret = down_interruptible(&filter->notif->request);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> + if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT) {
> + knotif = cur;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * If we didn't find a notification, it could be that the task was
> + * interrupted by a fatal signal between the time we were woken and
> + * when we were able to acquire the rw lock.
> + */
> + if (!knotif) {
> + ret = -ENOENT;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + unotif.id = knotif->id;
> + unotif.pid = task_pid_vnr(knotif->task);
> + unotif.data = *(knotif->data);
> +
> + knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT;
> + wake_up_poll(&filter->notif->wqh, EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM);
> + ret = 0;
> +out:
> + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
> +
> + if (ret == 0 && copy_to_user(buf, &unotif, sizeof(unotif))) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> + /*
> + * Userspace screwed up. To make sure that we keep this
> + * notification alive, let's reset it back to INIT. It
> + * may have died when we released the lock, so we need to make
> + * sure it's still around.
> + */
> + knotif = NULL;
> + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> + if (cur->id == unotif.id) {
> + knotif = cur;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (knotif) {
> + knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT;
> + up(&filter->notif->request);
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static long seccomp_notify_send(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
> + void __user *buf)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
> + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur;
> + long ret;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&resp, buf, sizeof(resp)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (resp.flags)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> + if (cur->id == resp.id) {
> + knotif = cur;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (!knotif) {
> + ret = -ENOENT;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* Allow exactly one reply. */
> + if (knotif->state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) {
> + ret = -EINPROGRESS;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = 0;
> + knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED;
> + knotif->error = resp.error;
> + knotif->val = resp.val;
> + complete(&knotif->ready);
> +out:
> + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static long seccomp_notify_id_valid(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
> + void __user *buf)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL;
> + u64 id;
> + long ret;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&id, buf, sizeof(id)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = -ENOENT;
> + list_for_each_entry(knotif, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> + if (knotif->id == id) {
> + if (knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT)
> + ret = 0;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> +
> +out:
> + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> + unsigned long arg)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
> + void __user *buf = (void __user *)arg;
> +
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV:
> + return seccomp_notify_recv(filter, buf);
> + case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND:
> + return seccomp_notify_send(filter, buf);
> + case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID:
> + return seccomp_notify_id_valid(filter, buf);
> + default:
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static __poll_t seccomp_notify_poll(struct file *file,
> + struct poll_table_struct *poll_tab)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
> + __poll_t ret = 0;
> + struct seccomp_knotif *cur;
> +
> + poll_wait(file, &filter->notif->wqh, poll_tab);
> +
> + ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return EPOLLERR;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> + if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT)
> + ret |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
> + if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT)
> + ret |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
> + if ((ret & EPOLLIN) && (ret & EPOLLOUT))
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct file_operations seccomp_notify_ops = {
> + .poll = seccomp_notify_poll,
> + .release = seccomp_notify_release,
> + .unlocked_ioctl = seccomp_notify_ioctl,
> +};
> +
> +static struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> +{
> + struct file *ret = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
> + struct seccomp_filter *cur;
> +
> + for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
> + if (cur->notif)
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> + filter->notif = kzalloc(sizeof(*(filter->notif)), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!filter->notif)
> + goto out;
> +
> + sema_init(&filter->notif->request, 0);
> + filter->notif->next_id = get_random_u64();
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&filter->notif->notifications);
> + init_waitqueue_head(&filter->notif->wqh);
> +
> + ret = anon_inode_getfile("seccomp notify", &seccomp_notify_ops,
> + filter, O_RDWR);
> + if (IS_ERR(ret))
> + goto out_notif;
> +
> + /* The file has a reference to it now */
> + __get_seccomp_filter(filter);
> +
> +out_notif:
> + if (IS_ERR(ret))
> + kfree(filter->notif);
> +out:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
> * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
> @@ -853,6 +1247,8 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
> const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
> struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
> long ret = -EINVAL;
> + int listener = -1;
> + struct file *listener_f = NULL;
>
> /* Validate flags. */
> if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK)
> @@ -863,13 +1259,28 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
> if (IS_ERR(prepared))
> return PTR_ERR(prepared);
>
> + if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) {
> + listener = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
> + if (listener < 0) {
> + ret = listener;
> + goto out_free;
> + }
> +
> + listener_f = init_listener(prepared);
> + if (IS_ERR(listener_f)) {
> + put_unused_fd(listener);
> + ret = PTR_ERR(listener_f);
> + goto out_free;
> + }
> + }
> +
> /*
> * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
> * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
> */
> if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
> mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
> - goto out_free;
> + goto out_put_fd;
>
> spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
>
> @@ -887,6 +1298,16 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
> spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
> if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
> mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> +out_put_fd:
> + if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) {
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + fput(listener_f);
> + put_unused_fd(listener);
> + } else {
> + fd_install(listener, listener_f);
> + ret = listener;
> + }
> + }
> out_free:
> seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
> return ret;
> @@ -911,6 +1332,7 @@ static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction)
> case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
> case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
> case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
> + case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
> case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
> case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
> case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
> @@ -922,6 +1344,20 @@ static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static long seccomp_get_notif_sizes(void __user *usizes)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes = {
> + .seccomp_notif = sizeof(struct seccomp_notif),
> + .seccomp_notif_resp = sizeof(struct seccomp_notif_resp),
> + .seccomp_data = sizeof(struct seccomp_data),
> + };
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(usizes, &sizes, sizeof(sizes)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
> static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
> void __user *uargs)
> @@ -938,6 +1374,11 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
> return -EINVAL;
>
> return seccomp_get_action_avail(uargs);
> + case SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES:
> + if (flags != 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return seccomp_get_notif_sizes(uargs);
> default:
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> @@ -1111,6 +1552,7 @@ long seccomp_get_metadata(struct task_struct *task,
> #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME "kill_thread"
> #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap"
> #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno"
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME "user_notif"
> #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace"
> #define SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME "log"
> #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow"
> @@ -1120,6 +1562,7 @@ static const char seccomp_actions_avail[] =
> SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME " "
> SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " "
> SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " "
> + SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME " "
> SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME " "
> SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME " "
> SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME;
> @@ -1134,6 +1577,7 @@ static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = {
> { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME },
> { SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME },
> { SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME },
> + { SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME },
> { SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME },
> { SECCOMP_LOG_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME },
> { SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME },
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> index e1473234968d..5c9768a1b8cd 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
> * Test code for seccomp bpf.
> */
>
> +#define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <sys/types.h>
>
> /*
> @@ -40,10 +41,12 @@
> #include <sys/fcntl.h>
> #include <sys/mman.h>
> #include <sys/times.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> +#include <sys/ioctl.h>
>
> -#define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <sys/syscall.h>
> +#include <poll.h>
>
> #include "../kselftest_harness.h"
>
> @@ -133,6 +136,10 @@ struct seccomp_data {
> #define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES
> +#define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3
> +#endif
> +
> #ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
> #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
> #endif
> @@ -154,6 +161,44 @@ struct seccomp_metadata {
> };
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER
> +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER (1UL << 3)
> +
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF 0x7fc00000U
> +
> +#define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC '!'
> +#define SECCOMP_IO(nr) _IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type) _IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type) _IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type) _IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
> +
> +/* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */
> +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND SECCOMP_IOWR(1, \
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp)
> +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64)
> +
> +struct seccomp_notif {
> + __u64 id;
> + __u32 pid;
> + __u32 flags;
> + struct seccomp_data data;
> +};
> +
> +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
> + __u64 id;
> + __s64 val;
> + __s32 error;
> + __u32 flags;
> +};
> +
> +struct seccomp_notif_sizes {
> + __u16 seccomp_notif;
> + __u16 seccomp_notif_resp;
> + __u16 seccomp_data;
> +};
> +#endif
> +
> #ifndef seccomp
> int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
> {
> @@ -2077,7 +2122,8 @@ TEST(detect_seccomp_filter_flags)
> {
> unsigned int flags[] = { SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
> SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
> - SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW };
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW,
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER };
> unsigned int flag, all_flags;
> int i;
> long ret;
> @@ -2933,6 +2979,403 @@ TEST(get_metadata)
> ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(pid, SIGKILL));
> }
>
> +static int user_trap_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags)
> +{
> + struct sock_filter filter[] = {
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
> + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
> + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF),
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
> + };
> +
> + struct sock_fprog prog = {
> + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
> + .filter = filter,
> + };
> +
> + return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog);
> +}
> +
> +#define USER_NOTIF_MAGIC 116983961184613L
> +TEST(user_notification_basic)
> +{
> + pid_t pid;
> + long ret;
> + int status, listener;
> + struct seccomp_notif req = {};
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
> + struct pollfd pollfd;
> +
> + struct sock_filter filter[] = {
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
> + };
> + struct sock_fprog prog = {
> + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
> + .filter = filter,
> + };
> +
> + pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +
> + /* Check that we get -ENOSYS with no listener attached */
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + if (user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, 0) < 0)
> + exit(1);
> + ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
> + exit(ret >= 0 || errno != ENOSYS);
> + }
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
> + EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> + EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +
> + /* Add some no-op filters so for grins. */
> + EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
> +
> + /* Check that the basic notification machinery works */
> + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
> + EXPECT_GE(listener, 0);
> +
> + /* Installing a second listener in the chain should EBUSY */
> + EXPECT_EQ(user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER),
> + -1);
> + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBUSY);
> +
> + pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
> + exit(ret != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
> + }
> +
> + pollfd.fd = listener;
> + pollfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
> +
> + EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, -1), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(pollfd.revents, POLLIN);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
> +
> + pollfd.fd = listener;
> + pollfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
> +
> + EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, -1), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(pollfd.revents, POLLOUT);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(req.data.nr, __NR_getpid);
> +
> + resp.id = req.id;
> + resp.error = 0;
> + resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
> +
> + /* check that we make sure flags == 0 */
> + resp.flags = 1;
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), -1);
> + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
> +
> + resp.flags = 0;
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
> + EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> + EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +}
> +
> +TEST(user_notification_kill_in_middle)
> +{
> + pid_t pid;
> + long ret;
> + int listener;
> + struct seccomp_notif req = {};
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
> +
> + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
> + EXPECT_GE(listener, 0);
> +
> + /*
> + * Check that nothing bad happens when we kill the task in the middle
> + * of a syscall.
> + */
> + pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
> + exit(ret != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
> + }
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req.id), 0);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(kill(pid, SIGKILL), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0), pid);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req.id), -1);
> +
> + resp.id = req.id;
> + ret = ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp);
> + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
> + EXPECT_EQ(errno, ENOENT);
> +}
> +
> +static int handled = -1;
> +
> +static void signal_handler(int signal)
> +{
> + if (write(handled, "c", 1) != 1)
> + perror("write from signal");
> +}
> +
> +TEST(user_notification_signal)
> +{
> + pid_t pid;
> + long ret;
> + int status, listener, sk_pair[2];
> + struct seccomp_notif req = {};
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
> + char c;
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sk_pair), 0);
> +
> + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_gettid,
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
> + EXPECT_GE(listener, 0);
> +
> + pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + close(sk_pair[0]);
> + handled = sk_pair[1];
> + if (signal(SIGUSR1, signal_handler) == SIG_ERR) {
> + perror("signal");
> + exit(1);
> + }
> + /*
> + * ERESTARTSYS behavior is a bit hard to test, because we need
> + * to rely on a signal that has not yet been handled. Let's at
> + * least check that the error code gets propagated through, and
> + * hope that it doesn't break when there is actually a signal :)
> + */
> + ret = syscall(__NR_gettid);
> + exit(!(ret == -1 && errno == 512));
> + }
> +
> + close(sk_pair[1]);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(kill(pid, SIGUSR1), 0);
> +
> + /*
> + * Make sure the signal really is delivered, which means we're not
> + * stuck in the user notification code any more and the notification
> + * should be dead.
> + */
> + EXPECT_EQ(read(sk_pair[0], &c, 1), 1);
> +
> + resp.id = req.id;
> + resp.error = -EPERM;
> + resp.val = 0;
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), -1);
> + EXPECT_EQ(errno, ENOENT);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
> +
> + resp.id = req.id;
> + resp.error = -512; /* -ERESTARTSYS */
> + resp.val = 0;
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
> + EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> + EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +}
> +
> +TEST(user_notification_closed_listener)
> +{
> + pid_t pid;
> + long ret;
> + int status, listener;
> +
> + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
> + SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
> + EXPECT_GE(listener, 0);
> +
> + /*
> + * Check that we get an ENOSYS when the listener is closed.
> + */
> + pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + close(listener);
> + ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
> + exit(ret != -1 && errno != ENOSYS);
> + }
> +
> + close(listener);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
> + EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> + EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Check that a pid in a child namespace still shows up as valid in ours.
> + */
> +TEST(user_notification_child_pid_ns)
> +{
> + pid_t pid;
> + int status, listener;
> + struct seccomp_notif req = {};
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
> +
> + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
> + ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
> +
> + pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +
> + if (pid == 0)
> + exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(req.pid, pid);
> +
> + resp.id = req.id;
> + resp.error = 0;
> + resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
> + EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> + EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> + close(listener);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Check that a pid in a sibling (i.e. unrelated) namespace shows up as 0, i.e.
> + * invalid.
> + */
> +TEST(user_notification_sibling_pid_ns)
> +{
> + pid_t pid, pid2;
> + int status, listener;
> + struct seccomp_notif req = {};
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
> +
> + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
> + ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
> +
> + pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
> +
> + pid2 = fork();
> + ASSERT_GE(pid2, 0);
> +
> + if (pid2 == 0)
> + exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid2, &status, 0), pid2);
> + EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> + EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> + exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
> + }
> +
> + /* Create the sibling ns, and sibling in it. */
> + EXPECT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(errno, 0);
> +
> + pid2 = fork();
> + EXPECT_GE(pid2, 0);
> +
> + if (pid2 == 0) {
> + ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
> + /*
> + * The pid should be 0, i.e. the task is in some namespace that
> + * we can't "see".
> + */
> + ASSERT_EQ(req.pid, 0);
> +
> + resp.id = req.id;
> + resp.error = 0;
> + resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + close(listener);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
> + EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> + EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid2, &status, 0), pid2);
> + EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> + EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +}
> +
> +TEST(user_notification_fault_recv)
> +{
> + pid_t pid;
> + int status, listener;
> + struct seccomp_notif req = {};
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
> +
> + listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
> + ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
> +
> + pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
> +
> + if (pid == 0)
> + exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
> +
> + /* Do a bad recv() */
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, NULL), -1);
> + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EFAULT);
> +
> + /* We should still be able to receive this notification, though. */
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(req.pid, pid);
> +
> + resp.id = req.id;
> + resp.error = 0;
> + resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
> + EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
> + EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +}
> +
> +TEST(seccomp_get_notif_sizes)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes;
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes), 0);
> + EXPECT_EQ(sizes.seccomp_notif, sizeof(struct seccomp_notif));
> + EXPECT_EQ(sizes.seccomp_notif_resp, sizeof(struct seccomp_notif_resp));
> +}
> +
> /*
> * TODO:
> * - add microbenchmarks
> --
> 2.19.1
>
--
Kees Cook
