On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 07:28:57AM +1100, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> On 2018-11-19, Christian Brauner <christian@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > + if (info) {
> > + ret = __copy_siginfo_from_user(sig, &kinfo, info);
> > + if (unlikely(ret))
> > + goto err;
> > + /*
> > + * Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
> > + * Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds
> > + * source info.
> > + */
> > + ret = -EPERM;
> > + if ((kinfo.si_code >= 0 || kinfo.si_code == SI_TKILL) &&
> > + (task_pid(current) != pid))
> > + goto err;
> > + } else {
> > + prepare_kill_siginfo(sig, &kinfo);
> > + }
>
> I wonder whether we should also have a pidns restriction here, since
> currently it isn't possible for a container process using a pidns to
> signal processes outside its pidns. AFAICS, this isn't done through an
> explicit check -- it's a side-effect of processes in a pidns not being
> able to address non-descendant-pidns processes.
>
> But maybe it's reasonable to allow sending a procfd to a different pidns
> and the same operations working on it? If we extend the procfd API to
No, I don't think so. I really don't want any fancy semantics in here.
Fancy doesn't get merged and fancy is hard to maintain. So we should do
something like:
if (proc_pid_ns() != current_pid_ns)
return EINVAL
> allow process creation this would allow a container to create a process
> outside its pidns.
>
> --
> Aleksa Sarai
> Senior Software Engineer (Containers)
> SUSE Linux GmbH
> <https://www.cyphar.com/>
