On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 12:54:10PM -0800, Daniel Colascione wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 12:43 PM, Christian Brauner
> <christian@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 01:28:41PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> > On Nov 18, 2018, at 12:44 PM, Daniel Colascione <dancol@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> >
> >>
> >> >
> >> > That is, I'm proposing an API that looks like this:
> >> >
> >> > int process_kill(int procfs_dfd, int signo, const union sigval value)
> >> >
> >> > If, later, process_kill were to *also* accept process-capability FDs,
> >> > nothing would break.
> >>
> >> Except that this makes it ambiguous to the caller as to whether their current creds are considered. So it would need to be a different syscall or at least a flag. Otherwise a lot of those nice theoretical properties go away.
> >
> > I can add a flag argument
> > int process_signal(int procfs_dfd, int signo, siginfo_t *info, int flags)
> > The way I see it process_signal() should be equivalent to kill(pid, signal) for now.
> > That is siginfo_t is cleared and set to:
> >
> > info.si_signo = sig;
> > info.si_errno = 0;
> > info.si_code = SI_USER;
> > info.si_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
> > info.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
>
> That makes sense. I just don't want to get into a situation where
> callers feel that they *have* to use the PID-based APIs to send a
> signal because process_kill doesn't offer some bit of functionality.
Yeah.
>
> Are you imagining something like requiring info t be NULL unless flags
> contains some "I have a siginfo_t" value?
Well, I was actually thinking about something like:
/**
* sys_process_signal - send a signal to a process trough a process file descriptor
* @fd: the file descriptor of the process
* @sig: signal to be sent
* @info: the signal info
* @flags: future flags to be passed
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(process_signal, int, fd, int, sig, siginfo_t __user *, info,
int, flags)
{
struct pid *pid;
struct fd *f;
kernel_siginfo_t kinfo;
/* Do not allow users to pass garbage. */
if (flags)
return -EINVAL;
int ret = __copy_siginfo_from_user(sig, &kinfo, info);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
/* For now, enforce that caller's creds are used. */
kinfo.si_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
kinfo.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
if (signal_impersonates_kernel(kinfo))
return -EPERM;
f = fdget(fd);
if (!f.file)
return -EBADF;
pid = f.file->private_data;
if (!pid)
return -EBADF;
return kill_pid_info(sig, kinfo, pid);
}
>
> BTW: passing SI_USER to rt_sigqueueinfo *should* as long as the
> passed-in si_pid and si_uid match what the kernel would set them to in
> the kill(2) case. The whole point of SI_USER is that the recipient
> knows that it can trust the origin information embedded in the
> siginfo_t in the signal handler. If the kernel verifies that a signal
> sender isn't actually lying, why not let people send SI_USER with
> rt_sigqueueinfo?
