On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 05:00:54PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 8:28 AM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > > As an alternative to SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_GET_LISTENER, perhaps a ptrace() > > version which can acquire filters is useful. There are at least two reasons > > this is preferable, even though it uses ptrace: > > > > 1. You can control tasks that aren't cooperating with you > > 2. You can control tasks whose filters block sendmsg() and socket(); if the > > task installs a filter which blocks these calls, there's no way with > > SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_GET_LISTENER to get the fd out to the privileged task. > > Hmm. I contemplated this a bit and looked at your example a bit, and > I have a few thoughts: > > - What happens if you nest code like your sample? That is, if you > are already in some container that is seccomped and there's a > listener, can you even run your sample? You can attach a filter with SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, but you can't attach a listener to any such filter as long as there is another listener somewhere in the chain (I disallowed this based on some feedback you sent earlier, it's an artificial restriction). > - Is there any association between the filter layer that uses the > USER_NOTIF return and the listener? How would this API express such a > relationship? Not sure exactly what you're asking here. There is the struct file*, but there could be many threads listening to it. > I realize that my dream of how this should all work requires eBPF and > BPF_CALL, so it may not be viable right now, but I'd like a better > understanding of how this all fits together. > > Also, I think that it's not strictly true that a filter that blocks > sendmsg() is problematic. You could clone a thread, call seccomp() in > that thread, then get a listener, then execve(). Or we could have a > seccomp() mode that adds a filter but only kicks in after execve(). > The latter could be generally useful. Yes, in fact some of the test code works this way. However, the case I was thinking of is the way a typical container manager works: it does some initial setup, clone()s the init task, does some final setup, load the seccomp profile, and exec() the container's init binary. There's no way for this container to get its seccomp fd back out of the container to the host if sendmsg() is blocked. Tycho
