Hi Andrew, Could I please have these patches upstreamed or at least put in a tree for more public testing? They've hit fsdevel a few times now, I have links to the discussions in the change log below. The following patches fix a couple of issues with the permission check we do in vfs_dedupe_file_range(). The first patch expands our check to allow dedupe of a file if the user owns it or otherwise would be allowed to write to it. Current behavior is that we'll allow dedupe only if: - the user is an admin (root) - the user has the file open for write This makes it impossible for a user to dedupe their own file set unless they do it as root, or ensure that all files have write permission. There's a couple of duperemove bugs open for this: https://github.com/markfasheh/duperemove/issues/129 https://github.com/markfasheh/duperemove/issues/86 The other problem we have is also related to forcing the user to open target files for write - A process trying to exec a file currently being deduped gets ETXTBUSY. The answer (as above) is to allow them to open the targets ro - root can already do this. There was a patch from Adam Borowski to fix this back in 2016: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/17/130 which I have incorporated into my changes. The 2nd patch fixes our return code for permission denied to be EPERM. For some reason we're returning EINVAL - I think that's probably my fault. At any rate, we need to be returning something descriptive of the actual problem, otherwise callers see EINVAL and can't really make a valid determination of what's gone wrong. This has also popped up in duperemove, mostly in the form of cryptic error messages. Because this is a code returned to userspace, I did check the other users of extent-same that I could find. Both 'bees' and 'rust-btrfs' do the same as duperemove and simply report the error (as they should). Lastly, I have an update to the fi_deduperange manpage to reflect these changes. That patch is attached below. Please apply. git pull https://github.com/markfasheh/linux dedupe-perms Thanks, --Mark Changes from V4 to V5: - Rebase and retest on 4.18-rc8 - Place updated manpage patch below, CC linux-api - V4 discussion: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10530365/ Changes from V3 to V4: - Add a patch (below) to ioctl_fideduperange.2 explaining our changes. I will send this patch once the kernel update is accepted. Thanks to Darrick Wong for this suggestion. - V3 discussion: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-btrfs/msg79135.html Changes from V2 to V3: - Return bool from allow_file_dedupe - V2 discussion: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-btrfs/msg78421.html Changes from V1 to V2: - Add inode_permission check as suggested by Adam Borowski - V1 discussion: https://marc.info/?l=linux-xfs&m=152606684017965&w=2 From: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@xxxxxxx> [PATCH] ioctl_fideduperange.2: clarify permission requirements dedupe permission checks were recently relaxed - update our man page to reflect those changes. Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@xxxxxxx> --- man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 b/man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 index 84d20a276..4040ee064 100644 --- a/man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 +++ b/man2/ioctl_fideduperange.2 @@ -105,9 +105,12 @@ The field must be zero. During the call, .IR src_fd -must be open for reading and +must be open for reading. .IR dest_fd -must be open for writing. +can be open for writing, or reading. +If +.IR dest_fd +is open for reading, the user must have write access to the file. The combined size of the struct .IR file_dedupe_range and the struct @@ -185,8 +188,8 @@ This can appear if the filesystem does not support deduplicating either file descriptor, or if either file descriptor refers to special inodes. .TP .B EPERM -.IR dest_fd -is immutable. +This will be returned if the user lacks permission to dedupe the file referenced by +.IR dest_fd . .TP .B ETXTBSY One of the files is a swap file. -- 2.15.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
