On 4/18/2018 5:46 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 8:41 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 4/18/2018 4:47 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container ID of a process,
>>>> emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record to document the event.
>>>> ...
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
>>>> index d258826..1b82191 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
>>>> @@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ struct task_struct {
>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
>>>> kuid_t loginuid;
>>>> unsigned int sessionid;
>>>> + u64 containerid;
>>> This one line addition to the task_struct scares me the most of
>>> anything in this patchset. Why? It's a field named "containerid" in
>>> a perhaps one of the most widely used core kernel structures; the
>>> possibilities for abuse are endless, and it's foolish to think we
>>> would ever be able to adequately police this.
>> If we can get the LSM infrastructure managed task blobs from
>> module stacking in ahead of this we could create a trivial security
>> module to manage this. It's not as if there aren't all sorts of
>> interactions between security modules and the audit system already.
> While yes, there are plenty of interactions between the two, it is
> possible to use audit without the LSMs and I would like to preserve
> that.
Fair enough.
> Further, I don't want to entangle two very complicated code
> changes or make the audit container ID effort dependent on LSM
> stacking.
Also fair, although the use case for container audit IDs is
already pulling in audit, namespaces (yeah, I know it's not
necessary for a container to use namespaces) security modules
(stacked and/or namespaced), cgroups and who knows what else.
> You're a good salesman Casey, but you're not that good ;)
I have to keep the skills sharpened somehow!
OK, I'll grant that this isn't a great fit.
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