Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] x86: Fix missing core serialization on migration

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On 11/13/2017 06:56 PM, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote:
----- On Nov 10, 2017, at 4:57 PM, Mathieu Desnoyers mathieu.desnoyers@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

----- On Nov 10, 2017, at 4:36 PM, Linus Torvalds torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
wrote:

On Fri, Nov 10, 2017 at 1:12 PM, Mathieu Desnoyers
<mathieu.desnoyers@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
x86 can return to user-space through sysexit and sysretq, which are not
core serializing. This breaks expectations from user-space about
sequential consistency from a single-threaded self-modifying program
point of view in specific migration patterns.

Feedback is welcome,
We should check with Intel. I would actually be surprised if the I$
can be out of sync with the D$ after a sysretq.  It would actually
break things like "read code from disk" too in theory.
That core serializing instruction is not that much about I$ vs D$
consistency, but rather about the processor speculatively executing code
ahead of its retirement point. Ref. Intel Architecture Software Developer's
Manual, Volume 3: System Programming.

7.1.3. "Handling Self- and Cross-Modifying Code":

"The act of a processor writing data into a currently executing code segment
with the intent of
executing that data as code is called self-modifying code. Intel Architecture
processors exhibit
model-specific behavior when executing self-modified code, depending upon how
far ahead of
the current execution pointer the code has been modified. As processor
architectures become
more complex and start to speculatively execute code ahead of the retirement
point (as in the P6
family processors), the rules regarding which code should execute, pre- or
post-modification,
become blurred. [...]"

AFAIU, this core serializing instruction seems to be needed for use-cases of
self-modifying code, but not for the initial load of a program from disk,
as the processor has no way to have speculatively executed any of its
instructions.
I figured out what you're pointing to: if exec() is executed by a previously
running thread, and there is no core serializing instruction between program
load and return to user-space, the kernel ends up acting like a JIT, indeed.

I think that's safe. The kernel has to execute a MOV CR3 instruction before it can execute code loaded by exec, and that is a serializing instruction. Loading and unloading shared libraries is made safe by the IRET executed by page faults (loading) and TLB shootdown IPIs (unloading).

Directly modifying code in userspace is unsafe if there is some non-coherent instruction cache. Instruction fetch and speculative execution are non-coherent, but they're probably too short (in current processors) to matter. Trace caches are probably large enough, but I don't know whether they are coherent or not.



Therefore, we'd also need to invoke sync_core_before_usermode() after loading
the program.

Let's wait to hear back from hpa,

Thanks,

Mathieu


Hopefully hpa can tell us more about this,

Thanks,

Mathieu


--
Mathieu Desnoyers
EfficiOS Inc.
http://www.efficios.com

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