This patch allows to have multiple private procfs instances inside the same pid namespace. For some cases procfs is more of a burden than an API, it is blocking lot of other features, and from time to time we have to workaround procfs to implement new features either in kernel or userspace. Discussion about security-related TODO items: "Here's another one: split up and modernize /proc." By Andy Lutomirski [1] Discussion about kernel pointer leaks: "And yes, as Kees and Daniel mentioned, it's definitely not just dmesg. In fact, the primary things tend to be /proc and /sys, not dmesg itself." By Linus Torvalds [2] Lot of other areas in the kernel and filesystems have been updated to be able to support private instances, devpts is one major example. The aim here is to modernize procfs, allow it to have multiple private instances, so we can implement on top modern features or security mechanisms without breaking userspace, or without affecting the shared procfs mount. The new features will apply on the private instances, and after more testing, months, maybe it can be made the default especially for IoT. This allows to absorbe changes, make improvments without breaking use cases, it is following the same path of devpts. The final aim is to be able to do inside a lightweight sandbox: mount -t proc -onewinstance,pids=ptraceable none /proc Which will be used for: 1) Embedded systems and IoT: usually we have one supervisor for apps, we have some lightweight sandbox support, however if we create pid namespaces we have to manage all the processes inside too, where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of apps each one inside its own mount namespace, maybe use network namespaces for vlans setups, but right now we only want mount namespaces, without all the other complexity. we want procfs to behave more like a real file system, and block access to inodes that belong to other users. 'hidepid=' will not work since it is a shared mount option. 2) Containers, sandboxes and Private instances of file systems - devpts case Historically, lot of file systems inside Linux kernel view when instantiated were just a mirror of an already created and mounted filesystem. This was the case of devpts filesystem, it seems at that time the requirements were to optimize things and reuse the same memory, etc. This design used to work but not anymore with today’s containers, IoT, hostile environments and all the privacy challenges that Linux faces. In that regards, devpts was updated so that each new mounts is a total independent file system by the following patches: “devpts: Make each mount of devpts an independent filesystem” by Eric W. Biederman [3] [4] 3) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run. The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate to all other procfs mounts. This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(), clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on /proc/<pids>/ to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with pids that the user can ptrace or not. By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict /proc/<pids>/ but more importantly this will give desktop users a generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes and which user can not. Side notes: * This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls that operate on pids, however /proc/<pid>/ is a Linux ABI using filesystem syscalls. With this change all LSMs should be able to analyze open/read/write/close... on /proc/<pid>/ 4) This will allow to implement new features either in kernel or userspace without having to worry about procfs. In containers, sandboxes, etc we have workarounds to hide some /proc inodes, this should be supported natively without doing extra complex work, the kernel should be able to support sane options that work with today and future Linux use cases. Changes of this patch: * 'newinstance' mount option, it was also suggesed by Andy Lutomirski [5]. When this option is passed we automatically create a private procfs instance. This is not the default behaviour since we do not want to break userspace and we do not want to provide different devices IDs by default when stat()ing inodes, I am not sure about all the use cases there [6]. * Also this patch moves the 'hidepid' and 'gid' mount options from being defined and used inside PID namespaces to their private proc_fs_info struct, cleaning both PID namespaces and procfs. Use cases of 'newinstance' mount option: * We create a private procfs instance that it is disconnected from the shared or other procfs instances. * "hidepid" instead of chaning all other mirrored procfs mounts, now it will work only on the new private instance. * "gid" instead of chaning all other mirrored procfs mounts, now it will work only on the new private instance. * The next patch that introduces "pids=ptraceable" mount option which will take precendence over "hidepid" will only work when 'newinstance' is set. Otherwise it is ignored. This should allow later after real testing to have a smooth transition to a procfs with default private instances. [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/ksummit-discuss/2017-January/004215.html [2] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/05/5 [3] https://lwn.net/Articles/689539/ [4] http://lxr.free-electrons.com/source/Documentation/filesystems/devpts.txt?v=3.14 [5] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/5/2/407 [6] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/5/3/357 Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@xxxxxxxxx> --- fs/proc/base.c | 4 +-- fs/proc/inode.c | 14 +++++--- fs/proc/root.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 2 -- include/linux/proc_fs.h | 30 ++++++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index f324c49..54b527c 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(inode->i_sb); - struct pid_namespace *pid = fs_info->pid_ns; + int hide_pid = proc_fs_hide_pid(fs_info); struct task_struct *task; bool has_perms; @@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) put_task_struct(task); if (!has_perms) { - if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { + if (hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { /* * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open() * consistent with each other. If a process diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c index bdd808d..faec32a 100644 --- a/fs/proc/inode.c +++ b/fs/proc/inode.c @@ -105,12 +105,16 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) { struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb; struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(sb); - struct pid_namespace *pid = fs_info->pid_ns; + int hide_pid = proc_fs_hide_pid(fs_info); + kgid_t pid_gid = proc_fs_pid_gid(fs_info); - if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) - seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid)); - if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF) - seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid); + if (proc_fs_newinstance(fs_info)) + seq_printf(seq, ",newinstance"); + + if (!gid_eq(pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) + seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(),pid_gid)); + if (hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF) + seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", hide_pid); return 0; } diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index 48cc481..33ab965 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -28,15 +28,57 @@ #include "internal.h" enum { - Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, Opt_err, + Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, Opt_newinstance, Opt_err, }; static const match_table_t tokens = { {Opt_hidepid, "hidepid=%u"}, {Opt_gid, "gid=%u"}, + {Opt_newinstance, "newinstance"}, {Opt_err, NULL}, }; +/* We only parse 'newinstance' option here */ +int proc_parse_early_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + char *p, *opts, *orig; + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + + if (!options) + return 0; + + opts = kstrdup(options, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!opts) + return -ENOMEM; + + orig = opts; + + while ((p = strsep(&opts, ",")) != NULL) { + int token; + + if (!*p) + continue; + + token = match_token(p, tokens, args); + switch (token) { + case Opt_newinstance: + proc_fs_set_newinstance(fs_info, true); + pr_info("proc: mounting a new procfs instance "); + break; + case Opt_gid: + case Opt_hidepid: + break; + default: + pr_err("proc: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" " + "or missing value\n", p); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + kfree(orig); + return 0; +} + int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) { char *p; @@ -75,6 +117,8 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) } proc_fs_set_hide_pid(fs_info, option); break; + case Opt_newinstance: + break; default: pr_err("proc: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" " "or missing value\n", p); @@ -87,18 +131,34 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) int proc_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) { + int error; struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(sb); sync_filesystem(sb); + + /* + * If this is a new instance, then parse again the proc mount + * options. + */ + if (proc_fs_newinstance(fs_info)) { + error = proc_parse_early_options(data, fs_info); + if (error < 0) + return error; + } + return !proc_parse_options(data, fs_info); } -static int proc_test_super(struct super_block *s, void *data) +static int proc_test_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data) { struct proc_fs_info *p = data; - struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(s); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(sb); + + if (!proc_fs_newinstance(p) && !proc_fs_newinstance(fs_info) && + p->pid_ns == fs_info->pid_ns) + return 1; - return p->pid_ns == fs_info->pid_ns; + return 0; } static int proc_set_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data) @@ -110,7 +170,7 @@ static int proc_set_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data) static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data) { - int error; + int error = 0; struct super_block *sb; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; @@ -126,10 +186,18 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, if (!fs_info) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + /* Set it as early as possible */ + proc_fs_set_newinstance(fs_info, false); + if (flags & SB_KERNMOUNT) { ns = data; data = NULL; } else { + /* Parse early mount options if not a kernel mount */ + error = proc_parse_early_options(data, fs_info); + if (error < 0) + goto error_fs_info; + ns = task_active_pid_ns(current); } diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h index f91a8bf..786ea04 100644 --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h @@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ struct pid_namespace { struct user_namespace *user_ns; struct ucounts *ucounts; struct work_struct proc_work; - kgid_t pid_gid; - int hide_pid; int reboot; /* group exit code if this pidns was rebooted */ struct ns_common ns; } __randomize_layout; diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h index 047d0d0..408b51d 100644 --- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h +++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ struct proc_fs_info { struct pid_namespace *pid_ns; struct dentry *proc_self; /* For /proc/self/ */ struct dentry *proc_thread_self; /* For /proc/thread-self/ */ + bool newinstance; /* Flag for new separated instances */ + kgid_t pid_gid; + int hide_pid; }; #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS @@ -27,22 +30,32 @@ static inline struct proc_fs_info *proc_sb(struct super_block *sb) static inline void proc_fs_set_hide_pid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, int hide_pid) { - fs_info->pid_ns->hide_pid = hide_pid; + fs_info->hide_pid = hide_pid; } static inline void proc_fs_set_pid_gid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, kgid_t gid) { - fs_info->pid_ns->pid_gid = gid; + fs_info->pid_gid = gid; +} + +static inline void proc_fs_set_newinstance(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, bool value) +{ + fs_info->newinstance = value; } static inline int proc_fs_hide_pid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) { - return fs_info->pid_ns->hide_pid; + return fs_info->hide_pid; } static inline kgid_t proc_fs_pid_gid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) { - return fs_info->pid_ns->pid_gid; + return fs_info->pid_gid; +} + +static inline bool proc_fs_newinstance(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + return fs_info->newinstance; } extern void proc_root_init(void); @@ -89,6 +102,10 @@ static inline void proc_fs_set_pid_gid(struct proc_info_fs *fs_info, kgid_t gid) { } +static inline void proc_fs_set_newinstance(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, bool value) +{ +} + static inline int proc_fs_hide_pid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) { return 0; @@ -99,6 +116,11 @@ extern kgid_t proc_fs_pid_gid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) return GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; } +static inline bool proc_fs_newinstance(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + return false; +} + extern inline struct proc_fs_info *proc_sb(struct super_block *sb) { return NULL;} static inline struct proc_dir_entry *proc_symlink(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry *parent,const char *dest) { return NULL;} -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
