On Mon, Nov 6, 2017 at 5:14 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Quoting Daniel Micay (danielmicay@xxxxxxxxx): >> Substantial added attack surface will never go away as a problem. There >> aren't a finite number of vulnerabilities to be found. > > There's varying levels of usefulness and quality. There is code which I > want to be able to use in a container, and code which I can't ever see a > reason for using there. The latter, especially if it's also in a > staging driver, would be nice to have a toggle to disable. > > You're not advocating dropping the added attack surface, only adding a > way of dealing with an 0day after the fact. Privilege raising 0days can > exist anywhere, not just in code which only root in a user namespace can > exercise. So from that point of view, ksplice seems a more complete > solution. Why not just actually fix the bad code block when we know > about it? > > Finally, it has been well argued that you can gain many new caps from > having only a few others. Given that, how could you ever be sure that, > if an 0day is found which allows root in a user ns to abuse > CAP_NET_ADMIN against the host, just keeping CAP_NET_ADMIN from them > would suffice? It seems to me that the existing control in > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone might be the better duct tape > in that case. > > -serge This seems to be heading toward "we need full zones in Linux" with their own procfs and sysfs namespace and a stricter isolation model for resources and capabilities. So long as things can happen in a namespace which have a privileged relationship with host resources, this is going to be cat-and-mouse to one degree or another. Containers and namespaces dont have a one-to-one relationship, so i'm not sure that's the best term to use in the kernel security context since there's a bunch of userspace and implementation delta across the different systems (with their own security models and so forth). Without accounting for what a specific implementation may or may not do, and only looking at "how do we reduce privileged impact on parent context from unprivileged namespaces," this patch does seem to provide a logical way of reducing the privileges available in such a namespace and often needed to mount escapes/impact parent context. -Boris -- Boris Lukashev Systems Architect Semper Victus -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
